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I. INTRODUCTION 
About sixty years ago the United States Supreme Court decided 
Everson v. Board of Education,1 a case marking the beginning of 
modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  Since then, in cases 
ranging from challenges to programs providing on-site religious 
education during school hours to challenges of school refusals to permit 
after-school lectures from a religious perspective, the Court has had 
several opportunities to clarify the respects in which religious education 
may be associated with public schools without violating constitutional 
guarantees.  The Court’s analysis of the implicated issues has been 
remarkably inconsistent, both in tone and in substance.  Indeed, the 
reasoning most recently embraced by the Court not only invalidates 
much of what had seemed foundational just a short time ago, but sets the 
 
∗ Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio. 
 1. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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stage for a repudiation of one of the central tenets of the jurisprudence, 
namely, that certain kinds of religious activities have no place in the 
public schools while classes are in session. 
This Article traces the development of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence with respect to religion in the public schools, noting how 
the Court’s analyses and justifications have changed over time, 
protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.  The Article examines how 
the logic of the Court’s current approach would permit practices long 
thought to violate Establishment Clause guarantees, concluding that the 
current approach is radically misconceived as a matter of both 
constitutional law and good public policy. 
II. THE CHANGING JURISPRUDENCE ON RELIGION IN THE SCHOOLS 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been anything but 
consistent since World War II.  While one might expect some variation 
because the Clause’s guarantees are implicated in such a variety of cases 
and contexts, one would not expect to see such inconsistency within one 
particular area, such as the degree to which sectarian activities can take 
place within public schools.  Yet, even within that area, the Court has 
sometimes interpreted the Clause to require strict separation between 
church and state, at other times interpreted the Clause to accord states 
great discretion with respect to the kinds of assistance they afford to 
religious instruction, and at still other times interpreted the Clause to 
impose an affirmative obligation on states to permit religious views to be 
expressed within the public schools.  In short, the current jurisprudence 
in this area is simply incoherent, which does not bode well for 
reasonable and plausible analyses regarding either the degree to which 
religious activities and practices are permissible in public schools in 
particular or for the degree to which religion and the state can overlap 
more generally. 
A. Everson 
Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township2 is the seminal 
case in modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence.3  The Court not 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Antony Barone Kolenc, “Mr. Scalia's Neighborhood”: A Home for Minority 
Religions?, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 819, 859 (2007) (discussing “the seminal decision of Everson v. 
Board of Education”).  See also James Forman, Jr., The Rise and Fall of School Vouchers: A Story 
of Religion, Race, and Politics, 54 UCLA L. REV. 547, 556 (2007);  Alan E. Garfield, What Should 
2
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only held that the Establishment Clause has been incorporated against 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,4 but in addition 
articulated its understanding of the seemingly expansive limitations 
imposed by the Establishment Clause.5  The opinion has sometimes been 
characterized as representing a staunch separationist approach to 
church/state relations,6 although there is reason to doubt that such a 
characterization accurately captures the decision.7 
At issue was a New Jersey program reimbursing parents for the 
costs incurred in transporting their children to school.8  After pointing 
 
We Celebrate on Constitution Day? 41 GA. L. REV. 453, 473 (2007) (discussing Everson); Martha 
A. Boden, Compassion Inaction: Why President Bush's Faith-Based Initiatives Violate the 
Establishment Clause, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 991, 1003 (2006) (“The 1947 landmark Everson 
decision is widely regarded as the beginning of modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”). 
 4. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.  See also Carl H. Esbeck, The 60th Anniversary of the 
Everson Decision and America's Church-State Proposition, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 15, 15 (2007-08) 
(“It is easy enough to state the reason for the decision's prominence, for it was in Everson where the 
Establishment Clause was first ‘incorporated’ through the Fourteenth Amendment and made 
applicable to the actions of all state and local governments.”). 
 5. See Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original 
Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 16 (2000) (noting that “in 
Everson, a five-Justice majority rejected the constitutional challenge in the case at hand, but all nine 
Justices endorsed a broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause . . . .”); James M. Boland, 
Constitutional Legitimacy and the Culture Wars: Rule of Law or Dictatorship of a Shifting Supreme 
Court Majority?  36 CUMB. L. REV. 245, 282 (2005-06) (“The Everson Court accepted a broad 
meaning of the Establishment Clause . . . .”); Christopher Pierre, Note, “With God All Things Are 
Possible,” Including Finding Ohio's State Motto Constitutional under the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 749, 753 (2001) (noting that a “broad interpretation of 
the Establishment Clause was first advanced in 1947 by Justice Hugo Black in the landmark case of 
Everson v. Board of Education”).  See also Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (offering a “broad interpretation 
to the ‘establishment of religion’ clause”). 
 6. See John M. Kang, Deliberating the Divine: On Extending the Justification from Truth to 
Religious Expression, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 65 (2007) (suggesting that the “staunch commitment to 
separation of church and state characterized the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence from 
Everson to the 1980s”); Bradley S. Tupi, Religious Freedom and the First Amendment, 45 DUQ. L. 
REV. 195, 219 (2007) (suggesting that Everson “laid the foundation for today's secularist 
jurisprudence”); Thomas A. Schweitzer, Bruce Ledewitz, American Religious Democracy: Coming 
to Terms with the End of Secular Politics, 23 TOURO L. REV. 561, 563 (2007) (book review) (“For 
decades following Everson, Supreme Court jurisprudence reflected, and most of the Academy 
supported, a secular consensus which adhered strictly to the wall of separation between Church and 
State.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 7. See infra notes 19-26 and accompanying text (explaining that the Everson Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the program). 
 8. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 3 (1947).  The Court states: 
A New Jersey statute authorizes its local school districts to make rules and contracts for 
the transportation of children to and from schools.  The appellee, a township board of 
education, acting pursuant to this statute authorized reimbursement to parents of money 
expended by them for the bus transportation of their children on regular busses operated 
by the public transportation system.  Part of this money was for the payment of 
3
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out that the program provided reimbursement to parents of 
schoolchildren generally (because public school children also took city 
buses to get to and from school9), the Court examined whether the 
Establishment Clause precluded the state’s providing financial assistance 
to those families with children going to religious schools.10 
The Court began its analysis by explaining that neither the state nor 
federal government “can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all 
religions, or prefer one religion over another”11 and, further, that “[n]o 
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious 
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form 
they may adopt to teach or practice religion.”12  The Court concluded by 
suggesting that “in the words of Jefferson, the clause against 
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of 
separation between Church and State.’”13 
The Everson language on its face appears to preclude a great deal.  
For example, the prohibition on passing laws that aid religion would 
seem to preclude a state’s paying the transportation costs of those 
children attending religious schools.  Further, the suggestion that taxes 
cannot be levied to support religious activities or institutions14 suggests 
that tax monies cannot be spent to support such institutions.15  Arguably, 
the state’s reimbursing parochial school transportation costs with tax 
monies supports religious institutions, both because the state’s doing so 
 
transportation of some children in the community to Catholic parochial schools. 
Id. 
 9. Id. at 17 (noting that the program involved “[s]pending tax-raised funds to pay the bus 
fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a general program under which it pays the fares of 
pupils attending public and other schools”). 
 10. See Note, “The Released Time” Cases Revisited: A Study of Group Decision making by 
the Supreme Court, 83 YALE L.J. 1202, 1207 (1974) (“Everson involved a challenge to the 
constitutionality of a local ordinance reimbursing parents of children who attended church-related 
schools for their children's bus fares on the town's public buses.”).  While there is no name 
associated with the note, it has since been identified as having been written by Justice Alito.  See 83 
YALE L.J. Pocket Part 1202 (Sept. 1, 2005) (attributing the note to now-Justice Alito). 
 11. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. 
 12. Id. at 16. 
 13. Id. (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). 
 14. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840 (1995) (“[A] 
tax levied for the direct support of a church or group of churches . . . would run contrary to 
Establishment Clause concerns dating from the earliest days of the Republic.”). 
 15. See Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 4-
5 (2006) (“From the very beginning of the modern era in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, for 
example, the Court could definitively assert that no tax money should ever be used to support 
religious institutions . . . .”). 
4
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might enable students to go to those schools who might otherwise be 
unable to do so16 and because the schools might otherwise feel pressured 
to subsidize some of the transportation costs, e.g., by charging less for 
other school services than they otherwise would have.17  Given the 
Court’s broad reading of the Establishment Clause, one might well have 
predicted that the Court would strike down the New Jersey program at 
issue.18 
Allegedly expansive interpretation of the Establishment Clause 
notwithstanding, the Court did not hold that the New Jersey program 
violated constitutional guarantees.19  The Court seemed to view the 
reimbursement program as a safety measure that would allow students to 
get to school more safely via bus rather than via more dangerous 
methods such as walking (where the child might have to cross busy 
streets) or hitchhiking.20  Analyzing the program as an attempt by the 
state to help parents get their children to and from accredited schools 
less dangerously,21 the Court denied both that the state was thereby 
supporting religious schools22 and that the “high and impregnable”23 
wall between church and state had been breached.24 
 
 16. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947) (“There is even a possibility that some 
of the children might not be sent to the church schools if the parents were compelled to pay their 
children's bus fares out of their own pockets . . . .”). 
 17. Indeed, it might be argued that transportation costs are as important as various other costs 
associated with parochial schooling.  See id. at 48 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).  Justice Rutledge states: 
Payment of transportation is no more, nor is it any the less essential to education, 
whether religious or secular, than payment for tuitions, for teachers' salaries, for 
buildings, equipment and necessary materials.  Nor is it any the less directly related, in a 
school giving religious instruction, to the primary religious objective all those essential 
items of cost are intended to achieve.  No rational line can be drawn between payment 
for such larger, but not more necessary, items and payment for transportation. 
Id. 
 18. See id. (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“No rational line can be drawn between payment for 
such larger, but not more necessary, items and payment for transportation.”). 
 19. Id. at 17 (“[W]e cannot say that the First Amendment prohibits New Jersey from spending 
taxraised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils . . . .”). 
 20. Id. at 7 (comparing the legislation to “reimburs[ing] needy parents, or all parents, for 
payment of the fares of their children so that they can ride in public busses to and from schools 
rather than run the risk of traffic and other hazards incident to walking or ‘hitchhiking’”). 
 21. Id. at 18 (suggesting that the statute “does no more than provide a general program to help 
parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from 
accredited schools”). 
 22. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (“The State contributes no money to the 
schools.  It does not support them.”). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. (“The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state.  That wall must 
be kept high and impregnable.  We could not approve the slightest breach.  New Jersey has not 
5
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Everson sent very mixed messages,25 making it difficult for lower 
courts to discern the prevailing limitations imposed by the Establishment 
Clause.  The Court used expansive language to describe the limitations 
imposed by the Clause,26 but nonetheless upheld a program that would 
benefit religious schools, e.g., by increasing their enrollments.  Lower 
courts would have to wait for subsequent cases from the Court to clarify 
the limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause. 
B. The Release-Time Cases 
While subsequent cases afforded the Court an opportunity to clarify 
the jurisprudence, no such clarification was forthcoming.  Indeed, it 
would have been difficult to predict the outcome in McCollum v. Board 
of Education,27 given Everson, or to predict the outcome in Zorach v. 
Clauson,28given Everson and McCollum, protestations to the contrary by 
members of the Court notwithstanding.29 
At issue in McCollum was a program of release-time during which 
students would receive religious instruction by privately paid religious 
teachers30 in the school building classrooms.31  Attendance would be 
taken at these classes, and the secular teachers would receive the 
attendance reports.32  Students not wishing to attend these religious 
classes would leave their classrooms to go to another room within the 
same building to further their secular studies.33 
 
breached it here.”). 
 25. See Joseph P. Viteritti, Davey's Plea: Blaine, Blair, Witters, and the Protection of 
Religious Freedom, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 299, 326 (2003) (“[T]he landmark Everson 
opinion that grounded a generation of secularist case law was a jumble of mixed messages”). 
 26. See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text. 
 27. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
 28. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
 29. See infra note 37 and accompanying text (noting that the McCollum Court suggested that 
McCollum was mandated by Everson). 
 30. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 205 (“[R]eligious teachers, employed by private religious groups, 
were permitted to come weekly into the school buildings during the regular hours set apart for 
secular teaching, and then and there for a period of thirty minutes substitute their religious teaching 
for the secular education provided under the compulsory education law.”). 
 31. Id. at 209. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. (“Students who did not choose to take the religious instruction were not released from 
public school duties; they were required to leave their classrooms and go to some other place in the 
school building for pursuit of their secular studies.”). 
6
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The McCollum Court noted that students were required by law to 
go to school,34 and that they would be released from that duty contingent 
upon their attending the religious classes.35  The Court struck down the 
program because it involved “a utilization of the tax-established and tax-
supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their 
faith,”36 suggesting that the program at issue was barred by Everson.37  
The government was engaging in behaviors that might be thought to 
violate the Establishment Clause in two distinct ways— “not only are 
the state’s taxsupported [sic] public school buildings used for the 
dissemination of religious doctrines,”38 but, in addition, the state 
“affords sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide 
pupils for their religious classes through use of the state’s compulsory 
public school machinery.”39 
Yet, the fact that the school buildings were tax-supported was not 
as important as the Court had implied.  The buses used to transport the 
students in Everson were also tax-supported,40 and that did not suffice to 
make the New Jersey program unconstitutional.  Further, not only were 
tax-supported buses being used, but the state was reimbursing the cost of 
the fares, making the state even more directly involved in helping 
students to receive religious instruction.  Thus, claims to the contrary 
notwithstanding, it was not obvious after Everson that the program at 
issue in McCollum was unconstitutional just because taxes helped pay 
for the building in which the instruction took place. 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 209-10. 
 36. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948). 
 37. Id. at 211 (suggesting that “the Illinois program is barred by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments if we adhere to the views expressed both by the majority and the minority in the 
Everson case”). 
 38. Id. at 212. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 3 (1947) (“The appellee, a township board of 
education, acting pursuant to this statute authorized reimbursement to parents of money expended 
by them for the bus transportation of their children on regular busses operated by the public 
transportation system.”); See also James E. Zucker, Better a Catholic than a Communist: 
Reexamining McCollum v. Board of Education and Zorach v. Clauson, 93 VA. L. REV. 2069, 
2073 (2007) (discussing the “Court's 1947 decision in Everson v. Board of Education, which upheld 
a school board's practice of reimbursing parents for the cost of transporting their children on public 
buses to parochial schools”); Mark J. Chadsey, Thomas Jefferson and the Establishment Clause, 40 
AKRON L. REV. 623, 623 n.5 (2007) (“In Everson, the question before the Court was whether New 
Jersey could direct local school boards to reimburse parents of students, including some attending 
parochial schools, for money spent on public bus transportation to and from school.”). 
7
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Even the fact that Illinois’s compulsory school law was viewed as 
aiding religious instruction in McCollum was not as important as the 
Court seemed to imply.  Many states had compulsory schooling laws 
that required parents to send their children to approved public or private 
schools.  For example, New Jersey required that students attend 
approved schools,41 which included public and parochial schools.42  Yet, 
this law aided religious instruction in that the law provided an incentive 
to attend approved parochial schools.  Parochial schools were given 
further aid when the Court upheld that state’s decision to authorize the 
reimbursement of the costs of transporting the children to those 
approved institutions providing religious education.43  Nonetheless, New 
Jersey’s having provided invaluable aids in helping children to receive 
religious instruction did not thereby make the program unconstitutional. 
While there are ways to analogize the New Jersey and Illinois 
programs for constitutional purposes so that the Court’s upholding the 
travel expense reimbursement in Everson would suggest that the Illinois 
program also passed muster, almost all members of the Court believed 
that the Establishment Clause precluded Illinois from permitting 
religious teaching in public school buildings.44  One way to understand 
the difference between Everson and McCollum is in the kind of aid 
afforded by the state—Everson upheld the constitutionality of the state’s 
promoting health and safety, while McCollum struck down the state’s 
promoting religious instruction.  Yet, interpreting the decisions as 
representing this categorical distinction is misleading, if not simply 
wrong.45  For example, in his McCollum concurrence, Justice 
Frankfurter noted: 
 
 41. See Richard Albert, Popular Will and the Establishment Clause: Rethinking Public 
Funding to Religious Schools, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 199, 213 (2005) (discussing “the requirements 
imposed by the state under compulsory education laws”). 
 42. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (noting that “parents may, in the discharge of their duty under 
state compulsory education laws, send their children to a religious rather than a public school if the 
school meets the secular educational requirements which the state has power to impose”). 
 43. Id. (reasoning that the statute authorizing the payment of transportation costs to religious 
schools “does no more than provide a general program to help parents get their children, regardless 
of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools”). 
 44. The only member of the Court to dissent in McCollum was Justice Reed.  See McCollum, 
333 U.S. at 238. 
 45. That said, others on the Court emphasized the importance of the distinction between the 
promotion of health and safety on the one hand and the promotion of religious instruction on the 
other.  Justice Black, who wrote the Everson opinion, offered his understanding of it in Allen.  See 
Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 252-53 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black states: 
[I]t is not difficult to distinguish books, which are the heart of any school, from bus 
fares, which provide a convenient and helpful general public transportation service.  
8
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Different forms which ‘released time’ has taken during more than 
thirty years of growth include programs which, like that before us, 
could not withstand the test of the Constitution; others may be found 
unexceptionable. We do not now attempt to weigh in the Constitutional 
scale every separate detail or various combination of factors which 
may establish a valid ‘released time’ program. We find that the basic 
Constitutional principle of absolute separation was violated when the 
State of Illinois, speaking through its Supreme Court, sustained the 
school authorities of Champaign in sponsoring and effectively 
furthering religious beliefs by its educational arrangement.46 
Thus, it was not at all clear that the Court was willing to paint the 
different programs with a broad brush, and then uphold or strike down 
the programs at issue in light of whether the program was designated as 
“instructional” rather than as “promoting health or safety.”  Justice 
Frankfurter implied that the constitutionality of release-time programs 
depended upon unspecified factors or combinations of factors.  While he 
did not thereby communicate which factors were important for 
constitutional purposes, he nonetheless suggested that some release-time 
programs might or did pass muster.  Yet, if all of the release-time 
programs involved religious instruction and some of them (based on the 
unspecified factors) did not violate constitutional guarantees, then it 
seems clear that the fact that a release program involved religious 
instruction rather than the promotion of health or safety did not alone 
suffice to establish the program’s unconstitutionality.47 
That the Court did not believe all release-time programs 
unconstitutional was made clear in Zorach v. Clauson,48 where the Court 
considered a New York City program releasing students during the 
school day so that they could go off-campus to receive religious 
instruction or engage in “devotional exercises.”49  Students who did not 
 
With respect to the former, state financial support actively and directly assists the 
teaching and propagation of sectarian religious viewpoints in clear conflict with the First 
Amendment's establishment bar; with respect to the latter, the State merely provides a 
general and nondiscriminatory transportation service in no way related to substantive 
religious views and beliefs. 
Id. 
 46. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948). 
 47. Indeed, some members of the McCollum Court believed at the time McCollum was 
decided that the New York program was constitutional, a view that was later validated in Zorach.  
See Zucker, supra note 40, at 2095 (suggesting that both Justices Reed and Burton believed that the 
New York plan passed constitutional muster). 
 48. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
 49. Id. at 308. 
9
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attend these religious classes would remain in school.50  The Court 
contrasted the New York program with the Illinois program that had 
been at issue in McCollum, noting that the latter had permitted religious 
teachers to use the public classrooms,51 whereas the former involved 
“neither religious instruction in public school classrooms nor the 
expenditure of public funds.”52 
Of course, it is not as if public funds were being used in McCollum 
to pay the religious instructors53—rather, the public funds expended 
were the de minimis funds54 involved in permitting tax-supported public 
property to be used for religious instruction.55  While there was no 
religious instruction on public school grounds in Zorach, McCollum had 
been written in such a way as to suggest that this was not an important 
distinction.56  For example, the McCollum Court had suggested that the 
reporting of attendance at the religious classes to the secular teachers 
 
 50. Id. (“Those not released stay in the classrooms.”). 
 51. Id. at 309 (“The case is therefore unlike McCollum v. Board of Education . . . which 
involved a ‘released time’ program from Illinois.  In that case the classrooms were turned over to 
religious instructors.”). 
 52. Id. at 308-09. 
 53. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 208 (1948) (“The council employed the 
religious teachers at no expense to the school authorities . . . .”). 
 54. See id. at 234 (Jackson, J., concurring).  Justice Jackson states: 
It can be argued, perhaps, that religious classes add some wear and tear on public 
buildings and that they should be charged with some expense for heat and light, even 
though the sessions devoted to religious instruction do not add to the length of the school 
day.  But the cost is neither substantial nor measurable . . . . 
Id. 
 55. See id. at 239 n.2 (Reed, J., dissenting).  Justice Reed states: 
There is no extra cost to the state but as a theoretical accounting problem it may be 
correct to charge to the classes their comparable proportion of the state expense for 
buildings, operation and teachers. In connection with the classes, the teachers need only 
keep a record of the pupils who attend. Increased custodial requirements are likewise 
nominal.  It is customary to use school buildings for community activities when not 
needed for school purposes. 
Id. 
 56. Id. at 240 (Reed, J., dissenting) (“From the tenor of the opinions I conclude that their 
teachings are that any use of a pupil's school time whether that use is on or off the school grounds, 
with the necessary school regulations to facilitate attendance, falls under the ban.”).  See also 
Zorach, 343 U.S. at 316 (Black, J., dissenting).  Justice Black states: 
I see no significant difference between the invalid Illinois system and that of New York 
here sustained.  Except for the use of the school buildings in Illinois, there is no 
difference between the systems which I consider even worthy of mention.  In the New 
York program, as in that of Illinois, the school authorities release some of the children on 
the condition that they attend the religious classes, get reports on whether they attend, 
and hold the other children in the school building until the religious hour is over. 
Id. 
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integrated the public and religious education in a way that was 
prohibited by the Establishment Clause.57  But the same kind of 
attendance reporting and, thus, integration was present in Zorach,58 
which would make Zorach seem constitutionally vulnerable.59 
The Zorach Court rejected that students were coerced into taking 
the religion classes,60 reasoning that the school authorities “do no more 
than release students whose parents so request.”61  Yet, no one had been 
forced to take the religion classes in McCollum.62  Rather, the students 
who had chosen not to participate in the Illinois religious instruction 
program felt alienated and humiliated,63 but that could hardly have been 
attributed to the state.64 
 
 57. See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 209-10.  The Court states: 
The operation of the state's compulsory education system thus assists and is integrated 
with the program of religious instruction carried on by separate religious sects.  Pupils 
compelled by law to go to school for secular education are released in part from their 
legal duty upon the condition that they attend the religious classes. 
Id. 
 58. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308 (1952) (“The churches make weekly reports to the 
schools, sending a list of children who have been released from public school but who have not 
reported for religious instruction.”). 
 59. Yet, it should be noted that in Everson, where the Court upheld the cooperation between 
church and state, the state had to rely on the attendance reports provided by the religious schools.  
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 44 A.2d 333, 335 (N.J. 1945) (“The payments to parents were in 
satisfaction of advancements made by them; and the amount was fixed upon the basis of the actual 
number of days' attendance as indicated upon each pupil's report card.”). 
 60. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 311. 
 61. Id. 
 62. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 232 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(“[C]omplainant's son may join religious classes if he chooses and if his parents so request, or he 
may stay out of them.”).  But see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 452 (1961) (“In 
McC[o]llum, state action permitted religious instruction in public school buildings during school 
hours and required students not attending the religious instruction to remain in their classrooms 
during that time.  The Court found that this system had the effect of coercing the children to attend 
religious classes.”). 
 63. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 232 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The complaint is that when others 
join and he does not, it sets him apart as a dissenter, which is humiliating.”). 
 64. Id. at 232-33 (Jackson, J., concurring).  Justice Jackson states: 
The complaint is that when others join and he does not, it sets him apart as a dissenter, 
which is humiliating.  Even admitting this to be true, it may be doubted whether the 
Constitution which, of course, protects the right to dissent, can be construed also to 
protect one from the embarrassment that always attends nonconformity, whether in 
religion, politics, behavior or dress. . . . [N]o legal compulsion is applied to 
complainant's son himself and no penalty is imposed or threatened from which we may 
relieve him . . . . 
Id. 
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Justice Frankfurter had suggested in McCollum that it was 
somewhat misleading to analyze the state’s role in the release-time 
program solely in terms of whether the state was coercing attendance.  
He explained that there had been attempts to hold church school classes 
during the week after school, but that this had not been successful 
because children had resisted attending religious instruction classes 
during playtime.65  Church leaders had decided that religious schooling 
during the week would only be successful if it could take place during 
regular school hours.66  But making the religious instruction available 
during regular school hours made the public school personnel more 
actively involved in the success of the program, although not in the 
sense that “any one or more teachers were using their office to persuade 
or force students to take the religious instruction.”67  Rather, they were 
involved in the sense that but for the willingness of the schools to give 
students the constrained choice between remaining in school to pursue 
secular studies or, instead, having the opportunity to receive religious 
instruction during school hours so that valued after-school playtime 
would not be diminished,68 the religious instruction program would have 
foundered. 
Yet, Zorach also involved releasing students during regular school 
hours to receive religious instruction.69  As Justice Frankfurter noted in 
 
 65. Id. at 222 (Frankfurter, J.)  (“Out of these inadequate efforts evolved the week-day church 
school, held on one or more afternoons a week after the close of the public school.  But children 
continued to be children; they wanted to play when school was out, particularly when other children 
were free to do so.”). 
 66. Id. (“Church leaders decided that if the week-day church school was to succeed, a way 
had to be found to give the child his religious education during what the child conceived to be his 
‘business hours.’”). 
 67. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311(1952). 
 68. It may well be that play time would nonetheless be diminished.  Presumably, those not 
attending the religious studies program would be in some kind of study hall.  See Steven H. Shiffrin, 
The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 92 (2004) (“[T]he 
program in essence suspended the duration of the school day by not holding classes for those who 
were not released and requiring them to stay in study hall.”); Paul E. Salamanca, The Role of 
Religion in Public Life and Official Pressure to Participate in Alcoholics Anonymous, 65 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1093, 1121 (1997) (noting that McCollum and Zorach “also shared, presumably, the 
characteristic of subjecting nonparticipating students to what might be considered dead time in 
study hall”).  Cf. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 309 (noting appellants’ argument that “the classroom activities 
come to a halt while the students who are released for religious instruction are on leave”).  But this 
would mean that the students could get their homework done while in school, thus freeing up other 
time that would have been spent doing homework.  Cf. Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality under the 
Religion Clauses,  81 NW. U. L. REV. 146, 163 n.73 (1986) (“I could imagine that the opportunity 
to get one's homework done at school would be highly regarded.”). 
 69. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 308 (“New York City has a program which permits its public schools 
12
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his Zorach dissent, there is a difference between closing the schools as a 
general matter, thereby freeing the children to attend religious schools or 
other activities, and in effect closing the school for some children but 
keeping it in session for others.70 
When analyzing whether the state is violating Establishment Clause 
guarantees by participating in a release-time program, one should 
consider how individuals who do not receive the religious instruction 
will be spending their time.  Some commentators suggest that the 
students who did not participate in the religious programming might 
have found the secular alternative rather uninteresting,71 which would 
have incentivized attendance at the religious classes.  Justice Frankfurter 
implied that there was a kind of coercion involved in the program, 
suggesting that “formalized religious instruction is substituted for other 
school activity which those who do not participate in the released-time 
program are compelled to attend.”72  He noted that if the school’s “doors 
are closed, they are closed upon those students who do not attend the 
religious instruction, in order to keep them within the school.”73  It was 
this element of coercing or, to put it another way, incentivizing the 
religious instruction that worried Justice Black, who viewed the relevant 
issue as “whether New York can use its compulsory education laws to 
help religious sects get attendants presumably too unenthusiastic to go 
unless moved to do so by the pressure of this state machinery.”74  He 
argued that “New York is manipulating its compulsory education laws to 
help religious sects get pupils.  This is not separation but combination of 
Church and State.”75 
The Zorach Court disputed Justice Black’s analysis, explaining that 
insofar as “an ‘establishment’ of religion [is] concerned, the separation 
must be complete and unequivocal.  The First Amendment within the 
 
to release students during the school day so that they may leave the school buildings and school 
grounds and go to religious centers for religious instruction or devotional exercises.”). 
 70. Id. at 320 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“There is all the difference in the world between 
letting the children out of school and letting some of them out of school into religious classes.”). 
 71. See Thomas C. Berg, Church-State Relations and the Social Ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr, 
73 N.C. L. REV. 1567, 1630 n.277 (1995) (“By requiring non-participating students to sit idly in 
study halls during the release time period, it imposed costs on such students and may have 
encouraged them to attend the religious classes.”).  See also Salamanca, supra note 68, at 1121 
(describing the study hall time as “dead time”). 
 72. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 321 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
 73. Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. at 318 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 75. Id. (Black, J., dissenting). 
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scope of its coverage permits no exception; the prohibition is 
absolute.”76  However, the Court noted that the First Amendment “does 
not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of 
Church and State,”77 reasoning that if the release program were 
unconstitutional, a whole host of other practices would also be 
unconstitutional. 
Churches could not be required to pay even property taxes. 
Municipalities would not be permitted to render police or fire 
protection to religious groups. Policemen who helped parishioners into 
their places of worship would violate the Constitution. Prayers in our 
legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the 
Chief Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a 
holiday; ‘so help me God’ in our courtroom oaths-these and all other 
references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public 
rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment. A 
fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the supplication with 
which the Court opens each session: ‘God save the United States and 
this Honorable Court.’ 78 
Yet, the Court’s recounting this “parade of horribles”79 undercuts 
its own analysis in two different respects.  First, it is not at all clear that 
it would be so terrible if indeed some of the practices discussed by the 
Court were discontinued.  For example, it is not so clear that great costs 
would be incurred were the Court to stop opening each session with 
“God save the United States and this Honorable Court,” although it 
might be argued that the Court’s opening each session that way does not 
impose a great harm on anyone.80 
Second, the Court had just been suggesting that the jurisprudence at 
issue carefully considers aspects of each case.  If that is true, however, 
the guiding principles might well allow the Court to make distinctions 
among practices, permitting some and prohibiting others.  It would thus 
not be at all clear that the Court’s holding that the New York system 
violated constitutional guarantees would mean that other practices, e.g., 
 
 76. Id. at 312. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952). 
 79. Hein v. Freedom for Religion Found., Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2553, 2571 (2007). 
 80. Cf. Marsh v. Chambers,  463 U.S. 783, 818 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing 
the Court’s presumed view that “features of our public life such as ‘God save the United States and 
this Honorable Court,’ ‘In God We Trust,’ ‘One Nation Under God,’ and the like” are at most “de 
minimis” violations of the Establishment Clause). 
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permitting a student to attend a religious service rather than school on a 
particular day in accord with her parents’ wishes, would also be 
constitutionally objectionable.81 
In his dissent, Justice Black noted some of the ways in which the 
systems at issue in Zorach and McCollum were similar.  For example, in 
McCollum, the state used its power to get the children into the schools 
and, further, would only release from school those who attended the 
religious classes.82  The same might have been said of the program at 
issue in Zorach.83  Indeed, Justice Black suggested that the sole 
difference between the programs upheld in Zorach and struck down in 
McCollum was where the program was taking place.  “Except for the use 
of the school buildings in Illinois, there is no difference between the 
systems which I consider even worthy of mention.”84 
 Justice Jackson seemed particularly incensed by the suggestion 
that anyone who would strike the New York plan was hostile to religion.  
“As one whose children, as a matter of free choice, have been sent to 
privately supported Church schools, I may challenge the Court’s 
suggestion that opposition to this plan can only be antireligious, 
 
 81. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).  The Court states: 
We would have to press the concept of separation of Church and State to these extremes 
to condemn the present law on constitutional grounds.  The nullification of this law 
would have wide and profound effects.  A catholic student applies to his teacher for 
permission to leave the school during hours on a Holy Day of Obligation to attend a 
mass.  A Jewish student asks his teacher for permission to be excused for Yom Kippur.  
A Protestant wants the afternoon off for a family baptismal ceremony.  In each case the 
teacher requires parental consent in writing.  In each case the teacher, in order to make 
sure the student is not a truant, goes further and requires a report from the priest, the 
rabbi, or the minister.  The teacher in other words cooperates in a religious program to 
the extent of making it possible for her students to participate in it.  Whether she does it 
occasionally for a few students, regularly for one, or pursuant to a systematized program 
designed to further the religious needs of all the students does not alter the character of 
the act. 
Id. 
 82. Id. at 316  (Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]he state did use its power to further the program by 
releasing some of the children from regular class work, insisting that those released attend the 
religious classes, and requiring that those who remained behind do some kind of academic work 
while the others received their religious training.”). 
 83. Id. (Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]he school authorities release some of the children on the 
condition that they attend the religious classes, get reports on whether they attend, and hold the 
other children in the school building until the religious hour is over.”). 
 84. Id. (Black, J., dissenting). See also Inke Muehlhoff, Freedom of Religion in Public 
Schools in Germany and in the United States, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 405, 415 (2000) (“Unlike 
the facts in McCollum, the religious instruction in Zorach took place outside of the public school 
buildings . . . .”). 
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atheistic, or agnostic.”85  Regrettably, the charge that those who would 
strike a religious program must be hostile to religion has been made 
repeatedly since then.86 
Substantively, it is not clear how to read Zorach.  Perhaps, as 
Justice Jackson suggests, the Zorach Court is emphasizing the 
importance of the location of the religious teaching,87 although that 
factor will become less important in the subsequent case law.88  Perhaps 
Zorach is suggesting that the Illinois program at issue in McCollum was 
struck down because it included several factors: the state used its 
coercive power to get the students in the schools and to keep them there 
unless they opted to participate in the religious program, the programs 
were integrated in that the religious school teachers were reporting 
attendance to the secular teachers, the students who did not attend the 
religious classes were required to remain in school and perform secular 
work, the program occurred while public school was in session, and the 
program was on-site.  Because the teaching took place off-site in the 
New York program at issue in Zorach, all of the McCollum factors were 
not present in Zorach and thus the New York and Illinois programs were 
distinguishable. 
Of course, the Zorach Court did not specify why the New York, but 
not the Illinois, program passed constitutional muster.  The Court did 
explain that “[g]overnment may not finance religious groups nor 
undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian education 
nor use secular institutions to force one or some religion on any 
 
 85. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 324 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 86. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 684 (2005) (implying that prohibiting the 
exhibition of the Ten Commandments would “evince a hostility to religion”). Cf. Wallace v. Jaffree, 
472 U.S. 38, 84 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Court does not hold that 
the Establishment Clause is so hostile to religion that it precludes the States from affording 
schoolchildren an opportunity for voluntary silent prayer.”). 
 87. See Norman Redlich, Separation of Church and State: The Burger Court's Tortuous 
Journey, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1094, 1097-98 (1985). Redlich states: 
In McCollum and Zorach there emerged a distinction that was to find more detailed 
expression in the opinions of the Burger Court: teaching religion on public school 
premises is an impermissible endorsement of religion, but a program of cooperation that 
enables the public and religious schools to perform their independent functions in their 
own ways might be permissible. 
Id. 
 88. See infra notes 116-281, 318-37 and accompanying text (discussing Widmar v. Vincent, 
454 U.S. 263 (1981); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Lamb's Chapel v. Center 
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); and Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 
533 U.S. 98 (2001)). 
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person.”89  However, these points were not particularly helpful because 
neither Illinois nor New York financed religious groups or blended 
secular and sectarian education or used secular institutions to impose 
religion on anyone.  So, too, while the Court noted that there was “no 
constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to 
be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the 
effective scope of religious influence,”90 the Court failed to explain why 
its striking down the New York program would have been hostile to 
religion whereas its striking down the Illinois program did not “manifest 
a governmental hostility to religion or religious teaching”91 but, instead, 
simply recognized that “both religion and government can best work to 
achieve their lofty aim if each is left free from the other within its 
respective sphere.”92 
One of the many confusing aspects of the Everson-McCollum-
Zorach line of cases is how or whether they can be reconciled or, 
perhaps, explained.  A factor that is tempting to consider is how the 
composition of the Court had changed during the period.  The Justices 
deciding Everson and McCollum were Justices Vinson, Black, Reed, 
Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Jackson, Rutledge and Burton.93  There 
were two changes on the Court by the time that Zorach was decided—
Justice Minton replaced Justice Rutledge and Justice Clark replaced 
Justice Murphy.94 
Yet, the changes on the Court will not alone explain the different 
results in McCollum and Zorach, since there was only one dissent in 
McCollum.95  Three Justices in the majority in McCollum were also in 
the majority in Zorach—Chief Justice Vinson, and Justices Burton and 
Douglas (who wrote the opinion).96 
Some suggest that Zorach is best understood as responding to the 
public outcry produced by McCollum,97 implying that the Court simply 
 
 89. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952). 
 90. Id.  
 91. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948). 
 92. Id. at 212. 
 93. See Alito, supra note 10, at 1208 n.41 (1974). 
 94. See id. at 1208 n.41. 
 95. See McCollum, 333 U.S at 238 (Reed, J., dissenting). 
 96. Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 121, 149 n.153 (2001) (“The new justices were Tom Clark and Sherman Minton.  But new 
personnel cannot alone explain the change from McCollum to Zorach.  Three carryover justices 
switched their votes: Chief Justice Fred Vinson, William Douglas (who wrote Zorach ), Harold 
Burton.”). 
 97. Cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 317 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I am aware that 
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modified its position to quell the uprising in public opinion.98  Focusing 
in particular on the opinion written by Justice Douglas, others suggest 
that Douglas was motivated by the political ambition to run for 
president,99 although there is reason to reject that interpretation.  Justice 
Douglas expressly claimed that he did not see McCollum and Zorach as 
incompatible— 
Three of us—The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice 
Burton—who join this opinion agreed that the ‘released time’ program 
involved in the McCollum case was unconstitutional.  It was our view 
at the time that the present type of ‘released time’ program was not 
prejudged by the McCollum case, a conclusion emphasized by the 
reservation of the question in the separate opinion by Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter in which Mr. Justice Burton joined.100 
There is some irony in Justice Douglas’s citing Justice 
Frankfurter’s McCollum concurrence, given Frankfurter’s dissent in 
Zorach.  However, Justice Frankfurter’s failure to specify the conditions 
that would make a release-time program constitutionally permissible 
may have been the product of a tactical decision on his part.  Precisely 
because those signing onto his concurrence might not have been in 
agreement about which factors were significant for constitutional 
purposes, he might have refused to specify what those factors were in 
order to get the others to sign onto his opinion.  Justice Reed in his 
McCollum dissent explicitly mentioned the New York program,101 
 
our McCollum decision on separation of Church and State has been subjected to a most searching 
examination throughout the country.  Probably few opinions from this Court in recent years have 
attracted more attention or stirred wider debate.”). 
 98. Michal R. Belknap, God and the Warren Court: The Quest for “A Wholesome 
Neutrality,” 9 SETON HALL Const. L.J. 401, 412 (1999).  Belknap states: 
McCollum triggered an outraged reaction by religious groups, almost all of which 
operated some form of released time program.  To quiet this furor, the Court in Zorach v. 
Clauson upheld a New York City plan under which students were allowed to leave 
school grounds during the school day to receive religious instruction or attend devotional 
exercises at religious centers. 
Id. 
 99. See L. Scott Smith, From Typology to Synthesis: Recasting the Jurisprudence of Religion, 
34 CAP. U. L. REV. 51, 86 n.255 (2005).  See also Bruce Allen Murphy, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND 
AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 311 (New York: Random House 2003) (“For Jackson, his 
colleague appeared to be taking this proreligion position because of his thoughts about the need to 
win the support of a Catholic constituency for a possible run for the presidency later that year.”). 
 100. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 315 n.8. 
 101. See McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 250-52 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting). 
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suggesting that while he believed that program constitutional the 
McCollum opinion implied that it was not.102 
Both Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Douglas were part of the 
majority opinion in Everson,103 so it might be tempting to think that their 
votes to uphold the program at issue in Zorach were easier to predict 
than Justice Burton’s, who was in the dissent in Everson.104  Yet, there is 
evidence that Justice Burton believed all along that McCollum and 
Zorach were compatible.105 
A separate question is why.  While it is true that the teaching 
occurred in the school in McCollum and off-site in Zorach, it is not clear 
why that was constitutionally significant.106  The extra cost to the state in 
McCollum cannot plausibly account for the difference.107  Perhaps it was 
 
 102. Id. at 252 (Reed, J., dissenting).  Justice Reed states: 
Since all these states use the facilities of the schools to aid the religious education to 
some extent, their desire to permit religious education to school children is thwarted by 
this Court's judgment.  Under it, as I understand its language, children cannot be released 
or dismissed from school to attend classes in religion while other children must remain 
to pursue secular education.  Teachers cannot keep the records as to which pupils are to 
be dismissed and which retained.  To do so is said to be an ‘aid’ in establishing religion; 
the use of public money for religion. 
Id. 
 103. In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), Justice Douglas implies that Everson was in error. 
See id. at 443 (Douglas, J. concurring) (“The Everson case seems in retrospect to be out of line with 
the First Amendment.”). 
 104. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 28 (1947) (Routledge, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Burton signed on to Justice Routledge’s dissent.  See also McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212 (Franfurter, 
J.) (“We dissented in Everson v. Board of Education . . . because in our view the Constitutional 
principle requiring separation of Church and State compelled invalidation of the ordinance sustained 
by the majority.”). Justice Burton signed on to this opinion.  See id. 
 105. See Alito, supra note 10, at 1220-21 (Justice Burton “insisted to both Justices Black and 
Frankfurter that in order for him to join their opinions they must not invalidate the New York 
released time plan.”). 
 106. Joseph M. McMillan, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District: Lowering the 
Establishment Clause Barrier in School-Aid Controversies, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 337, 345 (1994) 
(“The only significant difference between the invalid program in McCollum and the permissible one 
in Zorach was that in the latter case the students left school early to attend religion classes at an off-
campus location.”). 
 107. See McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 234 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).  
Justice Jackson states: 
In this case, however, any cost of this plan to the taxpayers is incalculable and 
negligible.  It can be argued, perhaps, that religious classes add some wear and tear on 
public buildings and that they should be charged with some expense for heat and light, 
even though the sessions devoted to religious instruction do not add to the length of the 
school day.  But the cost is neither substantial nor measurable, and no one seriously can 
say that the complainant's tax bill has been proved to be increased because of this plan.  I 
think it is doubtful whether the taxpayer in this case has shown any substantial property 
injury. 
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the symbolism of having such classes held in a public school,108 
although the Court would not find that rationale particularly compelling 
in subsequent cases.109 
While it may be possible to reconcile Zorach, Everson and 
McCollum substantively, there is no gainsaying that Zorach sets a much 
different tone than do Everson and McCollum.  Both the Everson and 
McCollum Courts discussed the impregnable wall between Church and 
State,110 while the Zorach Court wrote that “[w]e are a religious people 
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”111  Lest the 
implications of its view be unclear, the Zorach Court suggested that 
“[w]hen the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with 
religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to 
sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions.”112  Indeed, the 
Court explained that prohibiting the program at issue “would be to find 
in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous 
indifference to religious groups,”113 which would amount to “preferring 
those who believe in no religion over those who do believe.”114  Thus, 
whether or not the Court’s substantive position had changed, the tone in 
Zorach signaled that the Court might be adopting a much different 
 
Id. 
 108. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 262 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“The deeper difference was that the McCollum program placed the religious instructor 
in the public school classroom in precisely the position of authority held by the regular teachers of 
secular subjects, while the Zorach program did not.”); Cf. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 231.   
Separation means separation, not something less.  Jefferson's metaphor in describing the 
relation between Church and State speaks of a ‘wall of separation,’ not of a fine line 
easily overstepped.  The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the 
most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny.  In no activity of the State is it 
more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools, to avoid confusing, not to say 
fusing, what the Constitution sought to keep strictly apart.  ‘The great American 
principle of eternal separation’-Elihu Root's phrase bears repetition-is one of the vital 
reliances of our Constitutional system for assuring unities among our people stronger 
than our diversities.  It is the Court's duty to enforce this principle in its full integrity. 
Id. 
 109. See infra notes 213-50, 251-81, 318-37 and accompanying text (discussing Bd. of Educ. 
of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); and Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 
(2001)). 
 110. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212. 
 111. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). 
 112. Id. at 313-14. 
 113. Id. at 314. 
 114. Id. 
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approach to the accommodation of religion within the public school 
setting. 
C. Religious Student Groups’ Use of University Facilities 
One of the points emphasized by Justice Frankfurter was that the 
state’s keeping those children in school who did not attend the religious 
classes made the state a more active player in inducing students to take 
the religious instruction.  He believed that the Establishment Clause 
precluded the state from having such a role, although a majority of the 
Court did not agree that such a state role was precluded if the religious 
teaching took place off-site.  Neither McCollum nor Zorach addressed 
the inverse question, namely, whether having such instruction on-site but 
not during class time was prohibited by the Establishment Clause.  
While the Court would discuss that specific question in later cases,115 the 
Court addressed related questions in Widmar v. Vincent,116 offering an 
analysis that would play a central role in the Court’s subsequent analyses 
of the conditions under which instruction about religious matters could 
take place in the public schools. 
The Widmar Court examined whether the University of Missouri at 
Kansas City could preclude the use of school facilities by a student 
group wishing to engage in religious discussion and worship.117  The 
Court noted that the University had set up a forum for use by student 
groups118 and that it was precluding the plaintiff group from using the 
forum based on the members’ desire to engage in religious activities.119  
While a university forum is distinguishable from other fora such as parks 
or streets120 because of the school’s educational mission,121 the Court 
nonetheless suggested that the school could not prevent the group from 
 
 115. See infra notes 213-50, 251-81, 318-37 and accompanying text (discussing Bd. of Educ. 
of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); and Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 
(2001)). 
 116. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
 117. Id. at 265. 
 118. Id. at 267. 
 119. Id. at 269 (suggesting that the University was “discriminat[ing] against student groups and 
speakers based on their desire to use a generally open forum to engage in religious worship and 
discussion”). 
 120. Id. at 268 n.5 (noting that a “university differs in significant respects from public forums 
such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters”). 
 121. Id. (noting that the “university’s mission is education”).  The University described its own 
mission as “providing a ‘secular education’ to its students.”  See id. at 268 (emphasis in original). 
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using the forum unless that limitation could withstand examination 
under strict scrutiny.122 
The University attempted to justify its exclusion by suggesting that 
doing otherwise would have violated its Establishment Clause 
obligations.123  The Court agreed that complying with constitutional 
obligations implicated a compelling interest,124 but denied that the state’s 
permitting the group to meet violated Establishment Clause 
guarantees.125 
To some extent, the differing views on whether the Establishment 
Clause barred the student group from having access to the forum can be 
attributed to differing understandings of what would be implicated were 
such access permitted.  The University argued that its granting the 
religious group access would in effect mean that the University had 
created a religious forum,126 whereas the Court suggested that the proper 
way to characterize the issue was to examine whether the University 
could exclude groups from an open forum based on the religious content 
of their speech.127  Perhaps because of these differing ways of viewing 
the issue at hand, the Court rejected that the primary effect of opening 
the forum to this religious group would be to advance religion.128 
Of course, permitting a religious group to meet on campus would 
afford that organization some benefit.  However, a religious 
organization’s receipt of “incidental” benefits is not barred by the 
Establishment Clause.129  As the Widmar Court recognized, an important 
 
 122. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981).  The Court held that: 
[I]n order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public forum based on the religious 
content of a group’s intended speech, the University must . . . satisfy the standard of 
review appropriate to content-based exclusion.  It must show that its regulation is 
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve 
that end. 
Id. 
 123. Id. at 270-71 (“The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities to religious 
groups and speakers on the terms available to other groups without violating the Establishment 
Clause of the Constitution of the United States.”). 
 124. See id. at 271 (“We agree that the interest of the University in complying with its 
constitutional obligations may be characterized as compelling.”). 
 125. See id. at 271-73 (suggesting that permitting the group to meet satisfies the requirements 
of the three-part Lemon Test). 
 126. Id. at 273 (noting the University characterization of the relevant question as “whether the 
creation of a religious forum would violate the Establishment Clause”). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 (1981) (rejecting that “the primary effect of the 
public forum, open to all forms of discourse, would be to advance religion”). 
 129. Id. (citing Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973)). 
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issue in dispute was whether this benefit should be classified as 
“incidental” in light of the relevant jurisprudence.130 
Two reasons were offered to justify that permitting a religious 
organization access to an open forum in a university setting would only 
afford incidental benefits.  First, because many different types of groups 
had access to the forum, the University’s permitting the religious group 
to participate would not communicate state endorsement of that group’s 
beliefs or practices.131  Second, that there was such a broad array of 
nonreligious and religious speakers132 suggested that the primary effect 
of the forum was secular rather than sectarian.133 
Certainly, one possible way of distinguishing between affording an 
incidental benefit to religion on the one hand and having a primary effect 
of promoting religion on the other would be to examine whether the state 
had implicitly endorsed religion or, instead, had accorded benefits to 
many different groups among which one or a few happened to be 
religious.  Yet, at least one difficulty with the Court’s using this 
approach was that this was not how the Court had determined in the past 
whether a benefit was incidental, and the Court was allegedly deciding 
whether the benefit conferred was incidental in light of the past case 
law.134 
Consider Tilton v. Richardson,135 which involved a challenge to a 
federal act providing construction grants to private colleges and 
universities.  The Court spelled out the relevant Establishment Clause 
test: “[f]irst, does the Act reflect a secular legislative purpose?  Second, 
is the primary effect of the Act to advance or inhibit religion?  Third, 
does the administration of the Act foster an excessive government 
entanglement with religion?”136 
When analyzing the effect prong, the Court noted that the important 
consideration was not whether a religious institution had received some 
 
 130. Id. at 274. 
 131. Id. (“First, an open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of state 
approval on religious sects or practices.”). 
 132. Id. (“[T]he forum is available to a broad class of nonreligious as well as religious 
speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups at UMKC . . . .”). 
 133. Id. (suggesting that the forum’s being open to so many groups was “an important index of 
secular effect”). 
 134. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981) (“We are satisfied that any religious 
benefits of an open forum at UMKC would be ‘incidental’ within the meaning of our cases.”). 
 135. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). 
 136. See id. at 678.  The Court also considered whether the Act inhibited the free exercise of 
religion.  See id.  See also id. at 689. 
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benefit but, instead, whether the program’s primary effect was the 
advancement of religion.137  The Court explained that the federal act at 
issue had been carefully drafted to assure that only secular functions of 
religious institutions would receive funding.138  Grants and loans would 
only be used for “defined secular purposes,”139 and the Act expressly 
prohibited the use of funds for “religious instruction, training, or 
worship.”140  The Tilton Court made clear that the Establishment Clause 
does not bar all state programs that afford secular benefits to religious 
institutions, even if the state’s affording secular benefits would free up 
funds of the religious institution for sectarian uses.141  That those monies 
were freed up would be described as an incidental rather than primary 
effect of the secular aid. 
In Hunt v. McNair,142 the Court examined the constitutionality of a 
South Carolina law authorizing the issuance of revenue bonds for the 
benefit of the Baptist College of Charleston.143  Because these bonds 
would be tax-exempt, the College would be able to market the bonds at a 
significantly lower rate of interest than it would otherwise have to 
pay.144  The Hunt Court rejected the argument that no aid is permissible 
because “aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other 
resources on religious ends,”145 thus echoing the position articulated in 
Tilton that funds expended on secular projects need not violate 
Establishment Clause guarantees. 
After rejecting the “all aid is forbidden” view, the Hunt Court 
clarified the process by which to determine whether a program’s primary 
effect is to advance religion, explaining that to “identify ‘primary effect,’ 
 
 137. Id. at 679 (explaining that the “crucial question is not whether some benefit accrues to a 
religious institution as a consequence of the legislative program, but whether its principal or primary 
effect advances religion”). 
 138. Id. (noting that the act “was carefully drafted to ensure that the federally subsidized 
facilities would be devoted to the secular and not the religious function of the recipient 
institutions”). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 679-80. 
 141. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971).   
Construction grants surely aid these institutions in the sense that the construction of 
buildings will assist them to perform their various functions.  But bus transportation, 
textbooks, and tax exemptions all gave aid in the sense that religious bodies would 
otherwise have been forced to find other sources from which to finance these services.  
Yet all of these forms of governmental assistance have been upheld. 
 142. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973). 
 143. See id. at 736. 
 144. See id. at 739. 
 145. Id. at 743. 
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we narrow our focus from the statute as a whole to the only transaction 
presently before us.”146  Thus, the Court was not to consider all of the 
institutions benefited by the statute and then see whether, for example, 
most were religiously affiliated.  Rather, the Court was to narrow its 
focus and examine the effect of the statue on the particular institution at 
issue. 
When focusing on the effect on the institution in the case at hand, 
the Court would find the funding to have the primary effect of advancing 
religion when either of two conditions was true: (1) religion was so 
pervasive in the institution that it would be difficult to fund (what would 
usually be) a purely secular function without at the same time promoting 
sectarian interests,147 or (2) the funding was going to promote religious 
activity even if the school was predominantly secular in nature.148  
Basically, the Hunt Court suggests that as long as the funds go only to 
secular projects, the effect prong of the Establishment Clause will not be 
violated. 
In Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. 
Nyquist,149 the Court offered an analysis mirroring the salient 
considerations articulated in Tilton and Hunt.  Examining a New York 
program offering state funds to sectarian schools for maintenance and 
repair, the Court noted with disapproval that there had been no attempt 
to restrict funds so that they would only be used for the “upkeep of 
facilities used exclusively for secular purposes.”150  Nothing would have 
prevented a school from using the state funds to pay individuals to 
maintain the chapel or to renovate classrooms where religion was 
taught.151  The Nyquist Court struck down this direct funding of religious 
expression, all the while accepting the view articulated by the Hunt and 
Tilton Courts that state aid could be used to support secular functions in 
sectarian schools, even if that aid would indirectly support religion by 
freeing up monies for sectarian uses.152  Because the state would not 
 
 146. Id. at 742. 
 147. Id. at 743 (“Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion 
when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its 
functions are subsumed in the religious mission . . . .”). 
 148. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973) (“Aid normally may be thought to have a 
primary effect of advancing religion . . . when it funds a specifically religious activity in an 
otherwise substantially secular setting.”). 
 149. Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
 150. Id. at 774. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 775. The Court admitted that: 
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itself be helping these institutions to engage in religious activities, the 
Establishment Clause would not bar that kind of funding. 
Or, consider Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland153 in 
which the Court considered a Maryland program that gave funds to 
private colleges, provided that the funds would not be used for sectarian 
purposes.154  Noting that it had long since rejected that the state was 
precluded from providing even incidental benefits to religious 
organizations,155  the Court indicated that it was following the previous 
jurisprudence by characterizing incidental religious benefits as those that 
might result because an institution’s resources had been freed up by 
virtue of the state’s having provided secular benefits.156  The Roemer 
Court rejected a position that the Widmar Court seemed to endorse, 
namely, that the state’s supporting religious activities is permissible as 
long as secular activities are promoted as well.157 
Given the existing jurisprudence, it is difficult to see how the 
religious benefits at issue in Widmar could be considered “incidental.”  
While it may well have been true that students at the University would 
not have inferred state endorsement of the beliefs of the religious group 
by virtue of that group’s being afforded access to the forum158 and it may 
also have been true that the benefits were being provided to a “broad 
spectrum of groups,”159 those same points might have been made in the 
previous cases to justify state funding of sectarian activities.  But the 
Court had repeatedly made clear that the state could not fund sectarian 
activities without violating the effect prong of the Establishment Clause.  
Further, no exception had been offered suggesting that such funding was 
 
the provision of such neutral, nonideological aid, assisting only the secular functions of 
sectarian schools, served indirectly and incidentally to promote the religious function by 
rendering it more likely that children would attend sectarian schools and by freeing the 
budgets of those schools for use in other nonsecular areas. 
Id. 
 153. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736 (1976). 
 154. Id. at 739. 
 155. Id. at 747 (suggesting Everson “put to rest any argument that the State may never act in 
such a way that has the incidental effect of facilitating religious activity”). 
 156. Id. (noting that it was not “blind to the fact that in aiding a religious institution to perform 
a secular task, the State frees the institution’s resources to be put to sectarian ends”). 
 157. See id. (“The State may not, for example, pay for what is actually a religious education, 
even though it purports to be paying for a secular one, and even though it makes its aid available to 
secular and religious institutions alike.”). 
 158. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981) (rejecting that the University was 
giving an “imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices” by permitting the group to 
meet on campus). 
 159. Id. 
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permissible as long as many other activities were funded so that there 
would be no inference of endorsement.  Indeed, given Hunt’s 
explanation that the primary effect analysis requires the Court to focus 
on the challenged state action, it does not matter for purposes of 
deciding a program’s primary effect whether there is a broad rather than 
a narrow array of recipients.  The breadth of the range of recipients 
might well matter if the Court were examining whether there was a 
secular purpose, but that is a different prong of the test.160 
In one sense, the Widmar Court was correct to reject the 
University’s claim that its affording access to the religious group would 
involve its setting up a special religious forum.  Rather, the University 
would simply be giving access to this group, just as it had to so many 
other groups.  Yet, for purposes of the effect prong analysis where the 
focus is on whether the state aid will be used to promote sectarian 
activities, the University’s action should have been treated as if the 
University would be setting up a separate forum for the religious group.  
If, indeed, the group would be engaging in sectarian activities that the 
state was prohibited from supporting, then the past jurisprudence 
suggested that the state could not open up the forum to that group, even 
if the forum was open to many other groups that did not engage in 
sectarian activity.  The different kinds of funding at issue in the Tilton-
Roemer line of cases passed muster because they did not directly support 
any sectarian activity rather than, for example, because they would 
promote a little sectarian activity and a lot of secular activity.  The 
funding at issue in Nyquist did not pass muster because it might have 
promoted sectarian activity in addition to secular activity.  Basically, the 
Widmar Court radically altered the jurisprudence while claiming merely 
to apply it. 
Allegedly, the University of Missouri at Kansas City was engaging 
in content-based discrimination without an adequate justification when 
not affording the religious student group access to university facilities.161  
Yet, the University had merely been following the example set by the 
Court in the Tilton-Roemer line of cases in which the Court had 
suggested that the state was precluded from promoting sectarian 
activities.  Indeed, one of the lessons of that line of cases is that the State 
 
 160. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (offering the three prongs of the test 
announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)). 
 161. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277 (“[T]he University seeks to enforce a content-based exclusion of 
religious speech. Its exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a state regulation of 
speech should be content-neutral . . . .”). 
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must consider content when deciding whether its affording benefits 
comports with Establishment Clause limitations.  The funding at issue in 
the University cases passed muster precisely because it would not be 
used to construct or maintain buildings where sectarian instruction 
would take place, and the New York funding program at issue in Nyquist 
was struck down precisely because those funds might have been used to 
promote sectarian activities. 
D. Religious Worship v. Speech about Religion 
One of the important features of the Widmar opinion was its refusal 
to distinguish between religious worship and speech about religion.162  
The Court recognized that “speech about religion is speech entitled to 
the general protections of the First Amendment,”163 and then noted that 
the Heffron Court had assumed that “religious appeals to nonbelievers 
constituted protected ‘speech,’”164 as if Heffron thereby established that 
speech about religion and religious worship were equivalent for 
constitutional purposes.  Yet, citing Heffron as support for such a 
proposition was surprising for a number of reasons. 
At issue in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness (ISKCON)165 was a Minnesota State Fair regulation that 
“require[d] a religious organization desiring to distribute and sell 
religious literature and to solicit donations at a state fair to conduct those 
activities only at an assigned location within the fairgrounds even though 
application of the rule limits the religious practices of the 
organization.”166  The Krishnas were permitted to roam the Fair 
discussing their religious views,167 but were only allowed to solicit 
donations from a booth.168 
The Court accepted that “oral and written dissemination of the 
Krishnas’ religious views and doctrines is protected by the First 
Amendment.”169  Nonetheless, the Court upheld the restriction as a valid 
 
 162. See id. at 269 n.6. 
 163. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 n.6 (1981) (emphasis in original). 
 164. See id. at n.6 (emphasis in original). 
 165. Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981). 
 166. Id. at 642. 
 167. Id. at 643-44 (“[T]he Rule does not prevent organizational representatives from walking 
about the fairgrounds and communicating the organization's views with fair patrons in face-to-face 
discussions . . . .”). 
 168. Id. at 644 (noting that the rule required each exhibitor to “conduct its sales, distribution, 
and fund solicitation operations from a booth rented from the Society”). 
 169. Id. at 647. 
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time, place, manner restriction.170  Yet, nowhere in the ISKCON opinion 
was there a discussion of the difference between describing religious 
views and engaging in religious worship, much less the suggestion 
embraced by the Widmar Court that the two are equivalent for 
constitutional purposes.171 
The Widmar Court suggested that the case law “acknowledged the 
right of religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with 
others.”172 Yet, this is to compound the confusion.  The University was 
not denying the speakers access to the forum because they were 
religious—rather, the forum was not being provided to those who 
wished to engage in sectarian activities.  Religious speakers would of 
course have access to the forum, although the forum could not be used, 
for example, to engage in prayer. 
Perhaps the Widmar Court believed that the past jurisprudence did 
not accurately capture the dictates of the Establishment Clause.  But that 
is a separate claim.  Rather than address what the Court had held in the 
past, the Widmar Court simply pretended that the Court had said or done 
something else, and then applied the hypothesized rulings to the matter 
at hand. 
Consider the other case cited by the Court in support of the rights of 
religious speakers,173 Saia v. New York.174  At issue in Saia was a city 
law forbidding “the use of sound amplification devices except with 
permission of the Chief of Police.”175  Saia was a minister who used 
sound equipment to “amplify lectures on religious subjects.”176  The 
statute was struck down because there were no specified standards in 
light of which the police chief was to decide whether to permit the sound 
 
 170. See id. at 654 (“In our view, the Society may apply its Rule and confine the type of 
transactions at issue to designated locations without violating the First Amendment.”); Id. at 655 
(“Accordingly, the only question is the Rule's validity as a time, place, and manner restriction.”). 
 171. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 284 (1981) (White, J., dissenting).  Justice White 
states: 
A large part of respondents' argument, accepted by the court below and accepted by the 
majority, is founded on the proposition that because religious worship uses speech, it is 
protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.  Not only is it protected, 
they argue, but religious worship qua speech is not different from any other variety of 
protected speech as a matter of constitutional principle. 
Id. 
 172. Id. at 272 (citing Heffron v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948)). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Heffron v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948). 
 175. Id. at 558. 
 176. Id. at 559. 
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equipment to be used.177  Apparently, individuals had complained 
because they had found the volume annoying.178 
There is no discussion of what this religious individual was saying 
and, of course, no discussion of whether discourse on religious subjects 
and religious worship are equivalent for constitutional purposes.  
Further, in Saia, no question was presented regarding whether the state 
was prohibited, permitted, or required to support his speech.  Rather, at 
issue was whether the state could restrict his speech by giving a public 
official unfettered discretion with respect to the conditions under which 
the speech could be amplified.  Neither Saia nor Heffron was helpful in 
determining whether the state was obligated to provide support for 
religious worship in the same way that it provided support for discourse 
on religious or non-religious subjects. 
Justice Stevens justified the Widmar result in the following way: 
[T]he policy under attack would allow groups of young philosophers to 
meet to discuss their skepticism that a Supreme Being exists, or a 
group of political scientists to meet to debate the accuracy of the view 
that religion is the “opium of the people.” If school facilities may be 
used to discuss anticlerical doctrine, it seems to me that comparable 
use by a group desiring to express a belief in God must also be 
permitted.179 
Yet, Justice Stevens has not captured the relevant issue.  Young 
religious and areligious philosophers could meet to discuss whether and 
why they believed or did not believe in God without engaging in 
religious worship.  Political scientists could meet and discuss whether 
religion has been a curse or blessing for humankind without offering 
prayers.  Indeed, one can assert one’s belief in God without at the same 
time petitioning God for forgiveness or some other sort of benefit. 
Perhaps prayer should simply be treated as an assertion that God 
exists, at least for constitutional purposes.180  Or, perhaps, although not 
 
 177. Id at 560. The Court states: 
To use a loud-speaker or amplifier one has to get a permit from the Chief of Police.  
There are no standards prescribed for the exercise of his discretion.  The statute is not 
narrowly drawn to regulate the hours or places of use of loud-speakers, or the volume of 
sound (the decibels) to which they must be adjusted. 
Id. 
 178. Id. at 562 (“In this case a permit is denied because some persons were said to have found 
the sound annoying.  In the next one a permit may be denied because some people find the ideas 
annoying.”). 
 179. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 281 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 180. But see Daniel O. Conkle, The Establishment Clause and Religious Expression in 
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the same, both prayer and assertions that God exists should be permitted 
in a public forum,181 as should assertions that God does not exist or that 
prayer is an exercise in self-delusion.  The point here is merely that the 
kinds of justifications offered by the Court were specious, which 
undercuts both the persuasiveness of the holding and perceptions of the 
integrity of the Court. 
The Court itself had previously accepted that there is an important 
difference for constitutional purposes between talking about God and 
engaging in religious worship or indoctrination.  For example, the Court 
noted in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp182 that: 
it might well be said that one’s education is not complete without a 
study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its 
relationship to the advancement of civilization.  It certainly may be 
said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic 
qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the 
Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular 
program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First 
Amendment. But the exercises here do not fall into those categories.  
They are religious exercises, required by the States in violation of the 
command of the First Amendment that the Government maintain strict 
neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing religion.183 
At issue in Schempp was a Pennsylvania law requiring that Bible 
verses be read at the beginning of each school day.184  After the Bible 
passage was read, the Lord’s Prayer would be recited by the 
schoolchildren in unison.185  There was no requirement that the Bible 
 
Governmental Settings: Four Variables in Search of a Standard, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 315, 
317 (2007) (“Worshipful expression, such as prayer, is more troublesome than non-worshipful 
statements or affirmations.”); Kathleen A. Brady, The Push to Private Religious Expression: Are 
We Missing Something?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1147, 1238 (2002) (“Prayer, unlike other types of 
student expression, involves communication with the Divine, and required presence at an act of 
worship with which one disagrees might, for some people, be close to blasphemy.”). 
 181. See Conkle, supra note 180, at 326 (suggesting that Widmar is an easy case). 
 182. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 183. Id. at 225. 
 184. See id. at 205. The Court states: 
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by law, 24 Pa.Stat. s 15-1516, as amended, 
Pub.Law 1928 (Supp.1960) Dec. 17, 1959, requires that “At least ten verses from the 
Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each 
school day.  Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible 
reading, upon the written request of his parent or guardian.” 
Id. 
 185. Id. at 205-06. The Court states: 
They sought to enjoin the appellant school district, wherein the Schempp children attend 
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passage be from a particular Bible186 and, in fact, passages from different 
Bibles were read in the school at issue.187  No questions, comments, or 
interpretations were permitted to accompany the readings.188 
Students objecting to the readings either could leave the classroom 
or could remain in the classroom but refuse to participate.189  The 
Schempps190 had considered having their children excused from the 
exercises but had feared that the children’s relationships with teachers 
and classmates would thereby have been adversely affected.191 
The Court upheld the trial court determination that the Bible 
reading and the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer was a religious ceremony 
and, as such, forbidden by the Establishment Clause.192  The Court 
rejected that by striking down the ceremony it was thereby endorsing a 
“religion of secularism,”193 noting that the “study of the Bible or of 
religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of 
education, may . . . be effected consistently with the First 
Amendment.”194 
One infers from Schempp that Establishment Clause guarantees 
would not have been violated by a school program in which 
Comparative Religion was the first class of the day.  Yet, if starting the 
 
school, and its officers and the Superintendent of Public Instruction of the 
Commonwealth from continuing to conduct such readings and recitation of the Lord's 
Prayer in the public schools of the district pursuant to the statute. 
Id. 
 186. Id. at 207 (“The student reading the verses from the Bible may select the passages and 
read from any version he chooses.”). 
 187. Id. (“During the period in which the exercises have been conducted the King James, the 
Douay and the Revised Standard versions of the Bible have been used, as well as the Jewish Holy 
Scriptures.”). 
 188. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 207 (1963) (“There are no 
prefatory statements, no questions asked or solicited, no comments or explanations made and no 
interpretations given at or during the exercises.”). 
 189. Id. (“The students and parents are advised that the student may absent himself from the 
classroom or, should he elect to remain, not participate in the exercises.”). 
 190. The law was challenged by Edward Schempp his wife, Sidney, and their two children, 
Roger and Donna. See id. at 206. 
 191. Id. at 208 (“Edward Schempp testified at the second trial that he had considered having 
Roger and Donna excused from attendance at the exercises but decided against it for several 
reasons, including his belief that the children's relationships with their teachers and classmates 
would be adversely affected.”). 
 192. See id. at 223 (“We agree with the trial court's finding as to the religious character of the 
exercises.  Given that finding, the exercises and the law requiring them are in violation of the 
Establishment Clause.”). 
 193. Id. at 225. 
 194. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963). 
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school day each day with a Bible reading and prayer195 is prohibited by 
the Establishment Clause,196 then there must be something special about 
prayer or religious worship that can be taken into account in First 
Amendment analyses.  A separate issue involves the conditions, if any, 
under which prayer is permissible in public schools.197  However, the 
Widmar Court should not have pretended that no line can be or ever has 
been drawn between religious worship and discussions about religion,198 
even if the line is difficult to draw in some cases.199 
In his Schempp concurrence, Justice Douglas noted that “the 
Establishment Clause is not limited to precluding the State itself from 
conducting religious exercises.”200  He explained that the Establishment 
Clause is violated when “public funds, though small in amount, are 
being used to promote a religious exercise.”201 
Schempp was not the first time that the Court had struck down 
religious exercises in the public schools.  At issue in Engel v. Vitale202 
was the daily recitation of the “Regents’ prayer,”203 which involved the 
 
 195. Id. at 205. 
 196. Id. (“[W]e hold that the practices at issue and the laws requiring them are unconstitutional 
under the Establishment Clause, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 197. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 283 (1981) (White, J., dissenting) (“A state university 
may permit its property to be used for purely religious services without violating the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  With this I agree.”).  See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 67 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Nothing in the United States Constitution as 
interpreted by this Court or in the laws of the State of Alabama prohibits public school students 
from voluntarily praying at any time before, during, or after the schoolday.”). 
 198. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 284-85 (White, J., dissenting).  Justice White states: 
Just last Term, the Court found it sufficiently obvious that the Establishment Clause 
prohibited a State from posting a copy of the Ten Commandments on the classroom wall 
that a statute requiring such a posting was summarily struck down.  That case necessarily 
presumed that the State could not ignore the religious content of the written message, nor 
was it permitted to treat that content as it would, or must, treat, other-secular-messages 
under the First Amendment's protection of speech.  Similarly, the Court's decisions 
prohibiting prayer in the public schools rest on a content-based distinction between 
varieties of speech: as a speech act, apart from its content, a prayer is indistinguishable 
from a biology lesson. (citations omitted). 
Id. 
 199. Id. at 285 (White, J., dissenting) (“Although I agree that the line may be difficult to draw 
in many cases, surely the majority cannot seriously suggest that no line may ever be drawn.”).  See 
also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 231 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The fact is that the line which separates 
the secular from the sectarian in American life is elusive.”). 
 200. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 229 (1963) (Douglas J., 
concurring). 
 201. Id. at 229 (Douglas J., concurring). 
 202. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 203. Id. at 423. 
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following: “Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, 
and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our 
Country.”204  The Engel Court noted that there was “no doubt that New 
York’s program of daily classroom invocation of God’s blessings as 
prescribed in the Regents’ prayer is a religious activity.”205  The fact that 
New York permitted students to remain silent or be excused from the 
room did not save the practice from constitutional invalidation.206  The 
Engel Court did not equate prayer with discussion of religious subjects, 
instead suggesting that the “program of daily classroom invocation of 
God’s blessings as prescribed in the Regents’ prayer is a religious 
activity, [which] . . .  is a solemn avowal of divine faith and supplication 
for the blessings of the Almighty.”207  As such, the program violated 
Establishment Clause guarantees. 
Even after Widmar, the Court affirmed that prayer in school might 
be unconstitutional.  In Wallace v. Jaffree,208 the Court examined an 
Alabama minute-of-silence-or-voluntary-prayer statute,209 striking it 
down because it was enacted to promote religion and, indeed, had no 
secular purpose.210  However, as Justice O’Connor pointed out in her 
concurrence in the judgment, a moment of silence statute might not 
offend constitutional guarantees, precisely because “a moment of silence 
is not inherently religious”211 and because “a pupil who participates in a 
 
 204. Id. at 422. 
 205. Id. at 424. 
 206. Id. at 430 (“[T]he fact that the program, as modified and approved by state courts, does 
not require all pupils to recite the prayer but permits those who wish to do so to remain silent or be 
excused from the room, ignores the essential nature of the program's constitutional defects”). 
 207. Id. at 424. 
 208. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 209. See id. at 40 n.2. The Court states:  
Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp.1984) provides: “At the commencement of the first 
class of each day in all grades in all public schools the teacher in charge of the room in 
which each class is held may announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute 
in duration shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such 
period no other activities shall be engaged in.” 
Id. 
 210. See id. at 56.  The Court states: 
In applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask “whether government's actual 
purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.” [citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)] In this case, the answer to that question is 
dispositive.  For the record not only provides us with an unambiguous affirmative 
answer, but it also reveals that the enactment of § 16-1-20.1 was not motivated by any 
clearly secular purpose-indeed, the statute had no secular purpose. 
Id. 
 211. Id. at 72 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs, [because] . . . 
a student who objects to prayer is left to his or her own thoughts, and is 
not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts of others.”212  Both 
before and after Widmar, members of the Court have had no difficulty in 
differentiating prayer and religious worship from other kinds of 
discussions involving religion. 
E. Religious Students Groups Using High School Facilities 
A little less than a decade after Widmar, the Court examined 
whether a high school could preclude a student group from using its 
facilities after school to “read and discuss the Bible, to have fellowship, 
and to pray together.”213  In Board of Education of Westside Community 
Schools v. Mergens By and Through Mergens,214 the Court examined a 
Nebraska high school’s refusal to permit students to form a Christian 
club.215  At issue was whether federal law precluded the high school 
from denying recognition to this student group and, if so, whether that 
federal law violated Establishment Clause guarantees.216 
The Mergens plurality construed the statute as prohibiting the 
school from recognizing some non-curricular student clubs such as a 
chess club or stamp collecting club,217 and then refusing to recognize 
other clubs based on the content of that group’s speech.218  After finding 
that the school did recognize some non-curricular clubs,219 the plurality 
found that the school’s refusal to grant the student club official 
recognition violated the federal act.220 
 
 212. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 213. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 232 (1990). 
 214. Id. at 226. 
 215. Id. at 232. 
 216. See id. at 231. The Court states: 
This case requires us to decide whether the Equal Access Act, 98 Stat. 1302, 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 4071-4074, prohibits Westside High School from denying a student religious group 
permission to meet on school premises during noninstructional time, and if so, whether 
the Act, so construed, violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
Id. 
 217. There were many clubs from which students could choose, some curricular and others not.  
See id. (“Students at Westside High School are permitted to join various student groups and clubs, 
all of which meet after school hours on school premises.  The students may choose from 
approximately 30 recognized groups on a voluntary basis.”). 
 218. Id. at 240. 
 219. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 245 (1990) (“[W]e think it clear that Westside's existing student 
groups include one or more ‘noncurriculum related student groups.’”). 
 220. Id. at 247. 
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The next question was whether the Act violated Establishment 
Clause guarantees.  The Mergens plurality interpreted the principal 
argument against permitting recognition of the student group to be that: 
because the student religious meetings are held under school aegis, and 
because the State’s compulsory attendance laws bring the students 
together (and thereby provide a ready-made audience for student 
evangelists), an objective observer in the position of a secondary 
school student will perceive official school support for such religious 
meetings.221 
The plurality rejected that argument, noting that the state is 
permitted to accord incidental benefits to religious groups,222 and 
suggesting that a state’s refusing to permit religious groups to use 
facilities open to others “would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility 
toward religion.”223  Students would be unlikely to mistake the school’s 
recognizing the student group with the school’s endorsing that group224 
and, in any event, steps could be taken to make sure that students did not 
mistakenly believe that the religious group had received the school’s 
endorsement.225 
Yet, the plurality’s assurances to the contrary notwithstanding, even 
adults might be tempted to interpret the school’s actions somewhat 
differently than the plurality would have one believe.  Justice Kennedy, 
for example, wrote, 
I should think it inevitable that a public high school “endorses” a 
religious club, in a commonsense use of the term, if the club happens 
 
 221. Id. at 249. 
 222. Id. at 248 (noting that it had previously found in Widmar that “although incidental 
benefits accrued to religious groups who used university facilities, this result did not amount to an 
establishment of religion”). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 250 (“secondary school students are mature enough and are likely to understand that 
a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory 
basis” (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comty. Sch. Dist., 393 US 503 (1969))). 
 225. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 251 (1990).  The 
Court states: 
To the extent a school makes clear that its recognition of respondents' proposed club is 
not an endorsement of the views of the club's participants, see Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274, 
n. 14, 102 S.Ct. at 277, n. 14 (noting that university student handbook states that the 
university's name will not be identified with the aims, policies, or opinions of any 
student organization or its members), students will reasonably understand that the 
school's official recognition of the club evinces neutrality toward, rather than 
endorsement of, religious speech. 
Id. 
36
Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss1/5
10-STRASSER_EDITED.DOC2.DOC 1/29/2009  3:34:39 PM 
2009] RELIGION IN THE SCHOOLS 221 
 
to be one of many activities that the school permits students to choose 
in order to further the development of their intellect and character in an 
extracurricular setting.226 
He believed that the program did not violate constitutional guarantees, 
however, because no coercion had been established, i.e., no students had 
been coerced into joining such a club.227 
In his concurrence in the judgment, Justice Marshall noted that the 
plurality had ignored that the forum at issue in Widmar had differed 
substantially from the forum at issue in Mergens228 in that the University 
had more clearly disassociated itself from the respective religious club at 
issue than had the high school.229  He argued that schools permitting 
religious clubs on campus had the affirmative duty to disassociate 
themselves so that their endorsement of the club would not be 
inferred.230 
The plurality dismissed this objection by noting that the school 
could do more to assure that students would not infer endorsement.231  
Basically, the plurality understood Justice Marshall’s point but did not 
want to permit a school to refuse to recognize a religious club because of 
its own failure to disassociate itself from that club.232  However, the 
plurality could have made clear that schools had to take affirmative steps 
 
 226. Id. at 261 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 227. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The inquiry with 
respect to coercion must be whether the government imposes pressure upon a student to participate 
in a religious activity.”). 
 228. Id. at 265 (Marshall, concurring) (“But the plurality fails to recognize that the wide-open 
and independent character of the student forum in Widmar differs substantially from the forum at 
Westside.”). 
 229. See id. (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Given the nature and function of student clubs at 
Westside, the school makes no effort to disassociate itself from the activities and goals of its student 
clubs.”); id. at 266-67 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that “the University of Missouri took 
concrete steps to ensure that the University's name will not ‘be identified in any way with the aims, 
policies, programs, products, or opinions of any organization or its members’” (citing Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981) (quoting University of Missouri student handbook))). 
 230. See id. at 265 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The entry of religious clubs into 
such a realm poses a real danger that those clubs will be viewed as part of the school's effort to 
inculcate fundamental values.  The school's message with respect to its existing clubs is not one of 
toleration but one of endorsement.”). 
 231. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty.Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 251(1990) (“To the 
extent a school makes clear that its recognition of respondents' proposed club is not an endorsement 
of the views of the club's participants, . . . students will reasonably understand that the school's 
official recognition of the club evinces neutrality toward, rather than endorsement of, religious 
speech.” (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 n.14)). 
 232. Id. (“[P]etitioners' fear of a mistaken inference of endorsement is largely self-imposed, 
because the school itself has control over any impressions it gives its students.”). 
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to prevent even mistaken endorsement.233  By not doing so, the plurality 
implied that it was not taking the problem of perceived endorsement 
very seriously, an attitude that would be reinforced in subsequent 
cases.234 
Justice Marshall also objected that the Mergens plurality was not 
appreciating the role that the state was playing when requiring students 
to attend school and then permitting these clubs to meet on school 
grounds: 
When the government, through mandatory attendance laws, brings 
students together in a highly controlled environment every day for the 
better part of their waking hours and regulates virtually every aspect of 
their existence during that time, we should not be so quick to dismiss 
the problem of peer pressure as if the school environment had nothing 
to do with creating and fostering it.  The State has structured an 
environment in which students holding mainstream views may be able 
to coerce adherents of minority religions to attend club meetings or to 
adhere to club beliefs.  Thus, the State cannot disclaim its 
responsibility for those resulting pressures.235 
When making this point, he was echoing concerns articulated in 
McCollum236 and, indeed, he cited McCollum for support of his 
position.237  After all, the religious activities in McCollum also were not 
run by school officials.  However, McCollum differed from Mergens in 
that the only non-curricular activity was the religious studies class, 
whereas in McCollum there were numerous activities such as chess club, 
photography, etc.238 
The Mergens analysis was surprising for a number of reasons.  The 
Tilton Court had made clear that colleges and universities should be 
treated differently than primary and secondary schools for purposes of 
Establishment Clause analysis,239 and it thus was surprising that Widmar 
 
 233. Id. at 263 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Establishment Clause does not 
forbid the operation of the Act in such circumstances, but it does require schools to change their 
relationship to their fora so as to disassociate themselves effectively from religious clubs' speech.”). 
 234. See infra notes 330-33 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s dismissal of 
perceived endorsement worries in Good News Club). 
 235. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 269 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 236. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 237. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty.Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (Marshall, 
J., concurring). 
 238. Id. at 253-58 (for a list of the activities). 
 239. Cf. id. at 263 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The plurality's 
Establishment Clause analysis pays inadequate attention to the differences between this case and 
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would be the model for Mergens.240  After all, the Widmar Court had 
noted that a university setting should be differentiated from that of a 
primary or secondary school, because university students are less 
impressionable than are younger students and so might be less likely to 
perceive a school’s permitting a student religious club to meet on 
campus as representing some kind of endorsement by the school.241  
Nonetheless, two points might be made about the Widmar differentiation 
between younger students and university students.  First, it was not clear 
that this cited difference played much of a role in the Widmar analysis 
and, indeed, the Court only mentioned the difference between the 
maturity levels of the different students in a footnote.242  Second, the 
Mergens plurality modified the Widmar maturity rationale by suggesting 
that it had equal applicability to high school students.243 
One might have expected the Widmar plurality to have engaged in 
more discussion of McCollum and Zorach.  Ironically, the Mergens 
analysis suggested that Zorach was wrongly decided.  Given that the 
release-time at issue in Zorach could only be used to attend classes in 
religious instruction, it would seem that New York was endorsing the 
religion classes, even though they were conducted off-site, and thus that 
the state was violating Establishment Clause guarantees. 
As suggested by Justice Jackson in his Zorach dissent, one of the 
few ways to reconcile Zorach and McCollum was to suggest that the 
location of the classes was important244—they could not be conducted 
on-site but could be conducted off-site.  But the club meetings were 
 
Widmar and dismisses too lightly the distinctive pressures created by Westside's highly structured 
environment.”). 
 240. But see id. at 267 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).  Justice Marshall states: 
Thus, the underlying difference between this case and Widmar is not that college and 
high school students have varying capacities to perceive the subtle differences between 
toleration and endorsement, but rather that the University of Missouri and Westside 
actually choose to define their respective missions in different ways. 
Id. 
 241. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981) (“University students are, of course, 
young adults.  They are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate 
that the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion.” (citing Tilton v. Richardson,  403 
U.S. 672, 685-86 (1971))). 
 242. See id. at n.14. 
 243. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990) (“We think 
the logic of Widmar applies with equal force to the Equal Access Act.”).  Further, the plurality 
suggested that Congress shared its view about the maturity of high school students.  See id. at 250 
(“[W]e note that Congress specifically rejected the argument that high school students are likely to 
confuse an equal access policy with state sponsorship of religion.”). 
 244. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
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occurring on-site rather than off-site in Mergens.  Thus, Mergens seems 
difficult to reconcile as a constitutional matter with the previous cases 
most directly on point.  While neither McCollum nor Zorach established 
that Mergens was wrongly decided, both cases suggest that the Mergens 
plurality needed to do much more to justify its position as a 
constitutional matter. 
The Mergens plurality briefly mentioned the purpose of the club, 
but then offered the same analysis that it would have offered had the 
club been formed so that it could discuss matters of interest from a 
religious perspective.  Yet, much of the jurisprudence has distinguished 
prayer and inherently religious activities from other sorts of activities.  
If, for example, Justice Douglas is correct that the Establishment Clause 
is violated when “public funds, though small in amount, are being used 
to promote a religious exercise,”245 then it would not matter whether the 
provision of those funds would be construed by an objective observer as 
an endorsement of religion.  So, too, if Justice O’Connor was correct in 
her Wallace concurrence to distinguish between inherently religious 
activities and other activities that might be secular,246 then one would 
have expected some analysis of the different functions performed by the 
club.  Thus, it might have been argued that while discussions from a 
religious perspective could not be precluded, paradigmatically religious 
activities like prayer were subject to different treatment. 
The Mergens plurality gave short shrift to the claim that student 
peer pressure might have adverse effects on the high schoolers.  “[T]he 
possibility of student peer pressure remains, but there is little if any risk 
of official state endorsement or coercion where no formal classroom 
activities are involved and no school officials actively participate.”247  
Yet, it had been the student peer pressure that had motivated the 
challenges in McCollum248 and Schempp,249 and the Court had done 
nothing in those cases to undercut the seriousness of the difficulty 
thereby presented. 
An important part of the Mergens analysis involved the view that 
permitting the club to meet on campus provided only incidental benefits 
to religion.  Yet, these benefits could only be construed as “incidental” if 
 
 245. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 229 (1963) (Douglas J., 
concurring). 
 246. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text. 
 247. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 251 (emphasis in original). 
 248. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
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one looked to Widmar and rejected much if not all of the preceding 
jurisprudence.250  Nonetheless, this understanding of “incidental” offered 
in Widmar and repeated in Mergens would become further entrenched a 
few years later when the Court heard another case challenging a school’s 
refusal to allow its facilities to be used for religious purposes. 
In Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School 
District,251 the Court examined a New York law authorizing local school 
boards to adopt reasonable regulations for the use of school property for 
designated purposes while school was not in session.252  Religious 
purposes were not included among the permissible designated 
purposes.253 
At issue in particular was a request by an evangelical church to 
show a six-part film series containing lectures on family by James 
Dobson.254  The request was denied because it was “church related,”255 
notwithstanding that “school property could be used for ‘social, civic 
and recreational’ purposes.”256  Regrettably, there was no further 
discussion of what was meant by “church-related.”  For example, it 
could have involved a film in which viewers were called to prayer or 
instead it might merely have been discussing family issues from a 
particular Christian perspective. 
The Court of Appeals had held that the rule at issue was viewpoint 
neutral, because it was “applied in the same way to all uses of school 
property for religious purposes.”257  However, the Lamb’s Chapel Court 
noted: 
That all religions and all uses for religious purposes are treated 
alike . . . does not answer the critical question whether it discriminates 
on the basis of viewpoint to permit school property to be used for the 
presentation of all views about family issues and child rearing except 
those dealing with the subject matter from a religious standpoint.258 
A few points might be made about the Court’s analysis.  First, there 
are a few different ways to understand “dealing with the subject matter 
 
 250. See supra notes 131-60 and accompanying text. 
 251. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
 252. Id. at 386. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See id. at 388-89. 
 255. Id. at 389. 
 256. Id. at 391. 
 257. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393 (1993). 
 258. Id. 
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from a religious standpoint.”259  It might be thought to suggest that there 
is a uniform view among all religions about a particular matter, e.g., 
family matters, although that would be false.  For example, there are 
widely divergent views about the role of women in the family, whether 
same-sex marriage should be recognized, etcetera.260  Yet, a different 
way to understand the point is that the religious standpoint does not 
stand for a particular substantive position; rather, such a standpoint is 
compatible with a whole range of views on particular matters.  The 
religious viewpoint is distinctive in that it seeks to incorporate these 
varying substantive positions within a world view.261 
By precluding discussions from a religious viewpoint, the district 
was not precluding liberal or conservative discussions of family matters, 
since either kind of view might be presented from a non-religious 
perspective.  Nonetheless, the school district was excluding certain kinds 
of views—those seeking to locate positions on particular issues within a 
(religious) world view.  Because of this type of exclusion, it might be 
argued that there was viewpoint discrimination in Lamb’s Chapel. 
The school district had worried that its permitting the use of school 
property for religious purposes would violate Establishment Clause 
guarantees.262  However, the Court noted, the “showing of this film 
series would not have been during school hours, would not have been 
sponsored by the school, and would have been open to the public, not 
just to church members.”263  Further, a wide variety of groups had 
repeatedly used the facilities.264  Under these circumstances, the Court 
reasoned, any benefits to a religious group would be “incidental.” 265 
The Court cited Widmar as support for its conclusion that the 
religious benefits would have been incidental.266  The benefits were 
probably incidental even in light of the jurisprudence preceding Widmar 
if, in fact, this was merely a discussion offered from a particular 
 
 259. Id. 
 260. See Linda C. McClain, Intimate Affiliation and Democracy: Beyond Marriage?, 32 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 397 (2003) (“There are contests within religious communities over how best 
to interpret the import of such traditions on such matters as family, marriage, and the respective 
family roles of men and women.”). 
 261. Cf. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995) 
(“Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but it also provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a 
perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered.”). 
 262. Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394. 
 263. Id. at 395. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. See id. 
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Christian perspective,267 since such a presentation would not have 
involved sectarian activities.  Nonetheless, the Court cited Widmar in 
support of its conclusion that the benefits were incidental, as if Widmar 
were the culmination rather than the repudiation of past incidental 
benefit decisions. 
The film series might be contrasted with worship services—the 
Lamb’s Chapel Court noted that the Church had also asked to use school 
facilities for Sunday School and for Sunday morning church services for 
a year.268  That request had been denied,269 and the Church had not 
challenged that denial in the courts.270  The Court did not intimate how it 
would have viewed such a challenge, instead merely noting that the 
validity of the denial was not before it.271  One thus could not tell 
whether the Lamb’s Chapel Court was distinguishing the film series 
from the religious services or instead was suggesting that they were the 
same for constitutional purposes. 
Part of the difficulty in analyzing Lamb’s Chapel is that the Court 
merely suggested that the Church had “conceded that its showing of the 
film series would be for religious purposes.”272  Yet, it would serve 
religious purposes to discuss a matter from a particular perspective just 
as it might also serve religious purposes to pray.  Without further 
specification of which or what kind of religious purposes would be 
served, it is not even clear what the Lamb’s Chapel Court was 
suggesting must be permitted. 
The statute at issue did not permit use of the facilities for “religious 
worship or instruction.”273  Yet, “religious instruction” is amenable to 
different interpretations.  For example, does a course in World Religions 
amount to religious instruction because those taking the course learn 
about different religious beliefs and practices?  The Schempp court had 
expressly rejected that a course on world religions was the equivalent of 
engaging in religious prayer,274 notwithstanding that the content might 
be thought to involve religious instruction. 
 
 267. See id. at 396 (suggesting that this was merely a “presentation of a religious point of view 
about a subject the District otherwise opens to discussion on District property”). 
 268. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 387 n.2 (1993). 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 389 (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 770 F. Supp. 91, 
98-99 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)). 
 273. Id. (citing Lamb’s Chapel, 770 F. Supp. at 98-99). 
 274. See supra note 183 accompanying text. 
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Would it promote religious purposes to present religious views on 
the family?  Presumably.  But there would seem to be a big difference 
between discussing what a particular religious group suggests is its ideal 
picture of a family275 and an exhortation to prayer.276  Precisely because 
religious purposes and religious instruction might be thought to cover 
such a wide range of topics and practices, the Lamb’s Chapel opinion is 
compatible with a variety of views about what the Establishment Clause 
requires, permits, and prohibits.  For example, the decision is quite 
compatible with the view that while a school district “discriminates on 
 
 275. See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 388 n.3. The Court states: 
Turn Your Heart Toward Home is available now in a series of six discussion-provoking 
films: 
1) A FATHER LOOKS BACK emphasizes how swiftly time passes and appeals to all 
parents to ‘turn their hearts toward home’ during the all-important child-rearing years. 
(60 minutes.) 
2) POWER IN PARENTING: THE YOUNG CHILD begins by exploring the inherent 
nature of power, and offers many practical helps for facing the battlegrounds in child-
rearing-bedtime, mealtime and other confrontations so familiar to parents.  Dr. Dobson 
also takes a look at areas of conflict in marriage and other adult relationships.  (60 
minutes.) 
3) POWER IN PARENTING: THE ADOLESCENT discusses father/daughter and 
mother/son relationships, and the importance of allowing children to grow to develop as 
individuals.  Dr. Dobson also encourages parents to free themselves of undeserved guilt 
when their teenagers choose to rebel. (45 minutes.) 
“4) THE FAMILY UNDER FIRE views the family in the context of today's society, 
where a “civil war of values” is being waged.  Dr. Dobson urges parents to look at the 
effects of governmental interference, abortion and pornography, and to get involved.  To 
preserve what they care about most-their own families! (52 minutes.) 
Note: This film contains explicit information regarding the pornography industry.  Not 
recommended for young audiences. 
5) OVERCOMING A PAINFUL CHILDHOOD includes Shirley Dobson's intimate 
memories of a difficult childhood with her alcoholic father.  Mrs. Dobson recalls the 
influences which brought her to a loving God who saw her personal circumstances and 
heard her cries for help.  (40 minutes.) 
6) THE HERITAGE presents Dr. Dobson's powerful closing remarks.  Here he speaks 
clearly and convincingly of our traditional values which, if properly employed and 
defended, can assure happy, healthy, strengthened homes and family relationships in the 
years to come.  (60 minutes.) 
Id. 
 276. Cf. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 867 (1995) (Souter, 
J., dissenting).  Justice Souter states: 
This writing is no merely descriptive examination of religious doctrine or even of ideal 
Christian practice in confronting life's social and personal problems.  Nor is it merely the 
expression of editorial opinion that incidentally coincides with Christian ethics and 
reflects a Christian view of human obligation.  It is straightforward exhortation to enter 
into a relationship with God as revealed in Jesus Christ . . . . 
Id. 
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the basis of viewpoint . . . [if] permit[ting] school property to be used for 
the presentation of all views about family issues and child rearing except 
those dealing with the subject matter from a religious standpoint,”277 the 
school district acts permissibly when permitting expressions of religious 
viewpoints but prohibiting prayer.  For the Court to suggest that the 
“film series involved here no doubt dealt with a subject otherwise 
permissible under Rule 10, and its exhibition was denied solely because 
the series dealt with the subject from a religious standpoint”278 is by no 
means the equivalent of suggesting that if discussions of matters of 
public interest are permitted on school grounds then prayer must also be 
permitted.  Otherwise, the decisions striking down prayer in school but 
permitting discussion of secular matter would be much harder to 
justify.279  Indeed, because prayer might simply be described as 
presenting material from a religious viewpoint280 and because teachers in 
public schools present lots of material from areligious viewpoints, it 
might be argued that by representing multiple viewpoints (including the 
viewpoint represented by prayer) the school could not be inferred to be 
endorsing any of them.281   
Depending upon how Widmar, Lamb’s Chapel and other decisions 
are read, the Court’s position would seem to permit a whole host of 
practices previously thought impermissible, because the school could not 
reasonably be thought to be endorsing a particular (religious) position.  
Regrettably, subsequent analyses offered by the Court have done little if 
anything to cabin what might be taught in public schools without 
offending Establishment Clause guarantees.282 
The proper interpretation of Lamb’s Chapel was a matter of dispute 
in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia.283  At 
issue in Rosenberger was a refusal by the University of Virginia to pay 
the printing costs incurred by one of the recognized student groups, 
Wide Awake Productions, because it was a religious activity,284 which 
 
 277. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393 (1993). 
 278. Id. at 394. 
 279. See supra note 155 (including Justice White’s concurrence making this point). 
 280. See Lamb's Chapel at 395. See also infra note 328 and accompanying text. 
 281. Cf. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (“If the religious, irreligious, and 
areligious are all alike eligible for governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination 
that any particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the government.”). 
 282. See infra notes 318-37 and accompanying text (discussing rationales offered in Good 
News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001)). 
 283. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 284. Id. at 827. The Court states: 
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was defined as “any activity that ‘primarily promotes or manifests a 
particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.’”285  School 
policy precluded paying the costs of certain student activities, including 
religious activities.286 
The Rosenberger Court began its analysis by noting that it is 
“axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its 
substantive content or the message it conveys.”287  The Court then 
explained that when the “government targets not subject matter, but 
particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First 
Amendment is all the more blatant.”288  The state must not engage in 
viewpoint discrimination,289 even if permissibly engaging in content 
discrimination by setting up a limited public forum.290 
At issue in the case was whether the University was engaging in 
content rather than viewpoint discrimination—it was at the very least 
engaging in the former kind of discrimination by virtue of its having set 
up a limited public forum.  However, its having engaged in that kind of 
discrimination might pass constitutional muster; the Rosenberger Court 
recognized that the “necessities of confining a forum to the limited and 
legitimate purposes for which it was created may justify the State in 
reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.”291  
Thus, a state actor’s engaging in content discrimination might well be 
 
A few months after being given CIO status, WAP requested the SAF to pay its printer 
$5,862 for the costs of printing its newspaper.  The Appropriations Committee of the 
Student Council denied WAP's request on the ground that Wide Awake was a “religious 
activity” within the meaning of the Guidelines . . . . 
Id. 
 285. Id. at 825 (citing University Guidelines at 66a). 
 286. Id. at 824-825. The Court states: 
The Guidelines also specify, however, that the costs of certain activities of CIO's that are 
otherwise eligible for funding will not be reimbursed by the SAF.  The student activities 
that are excluded from SAF support are religious activities, philanthropic contributions 
and activities, political activities, activities that would jeopardize the University's tax-
exempt status, those which involve payment of honoraria or similar fees, or social 
entertainment or related expenses. 
Id. 
 287. Id. at 828 (citing Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)). 
 288. Id. at 829 (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)). 
 289. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (“These principles provide the framework forbidding the 
State to exercise viewpoint discrimination, even when the limited public forum is one of its own 
creation.”). 
 290. See id. (“The necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for 
which it was created may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of 
certain topics.”). 
 291. Id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)). 
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constitutionally permissible, whereas a state actor’s engaging in 
viewpoint discrimination is “presumed impermissible.”292 
To assess whether the content discrimination inherent in a limited 
public forum is justified, the Court will examine whether the State has 
“respect[ed] the lawful boundaries it has itself set.”293  The state will not 
be permitted to exclude speech from a limited public forum if the 
“distinction is not ‘reasonable in light of the purpose served by the 
forum,’”294 although the state may be justified in limiting discussion to 
certain topics.295 
One might have expected that after noting the restrictions on 
content discrimination, the Rosenberger Court would then have 
explained why or how the state was not being reasonable in how it had 
set up the limitations of the public forum at issue.  However, the Court 
did not offer that kind of analysis, instead holding that the University 
was engaging in impermissible viewpoint discrimination.296 
The Rosenberger Court suggested that the most instructive case for 
handling the issues before it was Lamb’s Chapel,297 which was described 
in the following way: 
There, a school district had opened school facilities for use after school 
hours by community groups for a wide variety of social, civic, and 
recreational purposes.  The district, however, had enacted a formal 
policy against opening facilities to groups for religious purposes. 
Invoking its policy, the district rejected a request from a group desiring 
to show a film series addressing various child-rearing questions from a 
“Christian perspective.” 298 
The Rosenberger Court thought that the University of Virginia 
policy before it was analogous to the New York policy that it had struck 
down in Lamb’s Chapel. 
[H]ere, as in Lamb’s Chapel, viewpoint discrimination is the proper 
way to interpret the University’s objections to Wide Awake.  By the 
very terms of the SAF prohibition, the University does not exclude 
 
 292. Id. at 830. 
 293. Id. at 829. 
 294. Id. (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804-06). 
 295. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
 296. Id. at 830 (noting that “viewpoint discrimination . . . is presumed impermissible when 
directed against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations”) (citing Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry 
Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)). 
 297. Id. at 830 (“The most recent and most apposite case is our decision in Lamb's Chapel.”). 
 298. Id. 
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religion as a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment those 
student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints.  
Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but it also provides, as it did 
here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a 
variety of subjects may be discussed and considered.  The prohibited 
perspective, not the general subject matter, resulted in the refusal to 
make third-party payments, for the subjects discussed were otherwise 
within the approved category of publications.299 
Yet, it was not as if the state was picking out a particular viewpoint, 
e.g., a particular Christian perspective, and precluding only that 
viewpoint from being expressed.  On the contrary, a whole class of 
viewpoints had been precluded, namely, those promoting a belief about 
the existence or non-existence of God.300  This limitation would not only 
apply to a whole host of Christian perspectives but also to other religious 
perspectives, as well as to areligious and antireligious perspectives. 
The Court seemed confused when responding to the point that a 
broad range of views was precluded.  For example, the Court suggested 
that the “dissent’s assertion that no viewpoint discrimination occurs 
because the Guidelines discriminate against an entire class of viewpoints 
reflects an insupportable assumption that all debate is bipolar and that 
antireligious speech is the only response to religious speech.”301  But the 
dissent had not been suggesting that there were only two possible 
views—religious and antireligious.  On the contrary, the dissent had 
suggested that a whole class of views had been precluded—religious, 
non-religious and anti-religious—with varying viewpoints within those 
sub-classes. 
Then, seeming to understand that the dissent was not characterizing 
the debate as bipolar, the Court suggested that the “dissent’s declaration 
that debate is not skewed so long as multiple voices are silenced is 
 
 299. Id. at 831. 
 300. See id. at  895-96 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
If the Guidelines were written or applied so as to limit only such Christian advocacy and 
no other evangelical efforts that might compete with it, the discrimination would be 
based on viewpoint.  But that is not what the regulation authorizes; it applies to Muslim 
and Jewish and Buddhist advocacy as well as to Christian.  And since it limits funding to 
activities promoting or manifesting a particular belief not only “in” but “about” a deity 
or ultimate reality, it applies to agnostics and atheists as well as it does to deists and 
theists as the University maintained at oral argument. 
Id. 
 301. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995). 
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simply wrong; the debate is skewed in multiple ways.”302  Yet, this too 
does not capture the difference at issue. 
Suppose that the subject of discussion was “family issues.”  
Certainly, were there fifteen possible views that might be articulated and 
were four of them barred from the discussion, the Court would be 
correct to suggest that such a policy would have skewed the debate in 
multiple ways.  But that would be because some views were being 
permitted while others were being prohibited.303  Were no discussions of 
family permitted, there would be no viewpoint discrimination.  A 
separate question would be whether restrictions on the forum would be 
reasonable in light of its purpose,304 but that is a different matter not 
involving a claim about viewpoint discrimination.305 
The Court was not entirely clear what it meant when suggesting 
that the University had not excluded religion as a subject matter but 
instead had disfavored religious editorial viewpoints.306  Perhaps it 
meant that the school permitted discussions about religion but did not 
permit religious worship.307  Yet, this does not capture the University 
 
 302. Id. at 831-32. 
 303. See id. at 894-95 (Souter, J., dissenting).  Justice Souter states: 
Other things being equal, viewpoint discrimination occurs when government allows one 
message while prohibiting the messages of those who can reasonably be expected to 
respond . . . . It is precisely this element of taking sides in a public debate that identifies 
viewpoint discrimination and makes it the most pernicious of all distinctions based on 
content.  Thus, if government assists those espousing one point of view, neutrality 
requires it to assist those espousing opposing points of view, as well. (citations omitted) 
Id. 
 304. See id. at 829 (“The State may not exclude speech where its distinction is not ‘reasonable 
in light of the purpose served by the forum.’”) (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Ed. Fund, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 804-806 (1985)). 
 305. Id. at 897 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter states: 
If a university wished to fund no speech beyond the subjects of pasta and cookie 
preparation, it surely would not be discriminating on the basis of someone's viewpoint, at 
least absent some controversial claim that pasta and cookies did not exist.  The upshot 
would be an instructional universe without higher education, but not a universe where 
one viewpoint was enriched above its competitors. 
Id. 
 306. Id. at 831. 
 307. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845 (1995). The 
court states: 
As we recognized in Widmar, official censorship would be far more inconsistent with the 
Establishment Clause's dictates than would governmental provision of secular printing 
services on a religion-blind basis.  “[T]he dissent fails to establish that the distinction 
[between ‘religious' speech and speech ‘about’ religion] has intelligible content.  There 
is no indication when ‘singing hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles' 
cease to be ‘singing, teaching, and reading’-all apparently forms of ‘speech,’ despite 
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policy at issue—a prohibition on promoting or manifesting a belief or 
lack of belief in God meant that discussions about God’s existence or 
non-existence were simply excluded from the forum.308  Religion as a 
subject matter was not excluded from the forum entirely, because 
religion addresses a range of issues including but not limited to 
questions concerning God’s existence, although a (possibly very large) 
subset of the discussion of religion has been taken off the table, namely, 
any discussions about God.  The University would not have been 
authorizing discussions about religion without authorizing religious 
worship; instead, it would have precluded the discussion of God whether 
in the form of debate or prayer. 
The Court’s view is more understandable if, when explicating the 
University prohibition on publications that primarily promote a belief 
about a deity or ultimate reality,309 the Court omits the term 
“primarily.”310  In that event, anything that promotes/manifests a belief 
in or about a deity or ultimate reality would be barred, which might be 
interpreted to mean that someone writing about family, for example, 
could not include in her discussion that her views were premised in some 
way on the existence or non-existence of God.311  But to offer such a 
reading is to analyze a policy that the University did not implement. 
Had the Court understood the University policy as if it had omitted 
the word “primarily,” then one might have expected the Court to explain 
that the difficulty with the policy was not that it barred payment for 
 
their religious subject matter-and become unprotected ‘worship.’” 
Id. 
 308. Cf. id. at 836 (“And the term ‘manifests’ would bring within the scope of the prohibition 
any writing that is explicable as resting upon a premise that presupposes the existence of a deity or 
ultimate reality.”). 
 309. Id. The Court states: 
The prohibition on funding on behalf of publications that “primarily promot[e] or 
manifes[t] a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality,” in its ordinary 
and commonsense meaning, has a vast potential reach.  The term “promotes” as used 
here would comprehend any writing advocating a philosophic position that rests upon a 
belief in a deity or ultimate reality. 
Id. 
 310. See id. at 896 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 311. Cf. id. at 837. The Court states: 
If any manifestation of beliefs in first principles disqualifies the writing, as seems to be 
the case, it is indeed difficult to name renowned thinkers whose writings would be 
accepted, save perhaps for articles disclaiming all connection to their ultimate 
philosophy. Plato could contrive perhaps to submit an acceptable essay on making pasta 
or peanut butter cookies, provided he did not point out their (necessary) imperfections. 
Id. 
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printing costs of publications discussing the existence or non-existence 
of God, but that it barred the payment of printing costs of publications 
that mentioned or even implied the existence or non-existence of God.  
Such a policy might be viewed as so sweeping as to be unreasonable.  
Indeed, the Court suggested that the Virginia policy “effects a sweeping 
restriction on student thought and student inquiry in the context of 
University sponsored publications,”312 although the Court never 
explained why that was so or why it was even plausible to construe the 
policy as having such a broad sweep. 
If the problem with the policy was that it was so broad, then one 
might expect that a much narrower policy would not be subject to the 
same objections.  Yet, one infers that the Court would not have been 
satisfied had the University of Virginia had a narrow policy, say, only 
precluding the funding of inherently sectarian publications.  The Court 
noted, “If the expenditure of governmental funds is prohibited whenever 
those funds pay for a service that is . . . used by a group for sectarian 
purposes, then Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb’s Chapel would have to be 
overruled.”313 
Yet, those cases would have to be overruled only if one defined 
“sectarian purposes” in a particular way and only if one read those cases 
as focused on those sectarian purposes.  If, for example, the government 
was barred from funding sectarian activities such as prayer, that would 
not in addition bar the government from providing a venue in which a 
particular subject could be addressed from a religious perspective. 
The Rosenberger Court referred to Tilton, Hunt and Roemer with 
approval, suggesting that they stood for the principle that there are 
“special Establishment Clause dangers where the government makes 
direct money payments to sectarian institution.”314  But those cases did 
more than that, since they suggested that the state could not support 
sectarian activities even if the funds were awarded to a wide array of 
recipients.  Ironically, after suggesting that it “does not violate the 
Establishment Clause for a public university to grant access to its 
facilities on a religion-neutral basis to a wide spectrum of student 
groups, including groups that use meeting rooms for sectarian activities, 
accompanied by some devotional exercises,”315 and describing the 
 
 312. Id. at 836. 
 313. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 843 (1995). 
 314. Id. at 842. 
 315. Id. (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981); Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. 
Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 252 (1990)). 
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benefits to religion accorded under such a program as “incidental,”316 the 
Rosenberger Court said nothing about the apparent tension between its 
holding and the Tilton-Hunt line of cases that it had just cited with 
approval. 
 In his dissent, Justice Souter argued that “[u]sing public funds for 
the direct subsidization of preaching the word is categorically forbidden 
under the Establishment Clause, and if the Clause was meant to 
accomplish nothing else, it was meant to bar this use of public 
money.”317  Here, Justice Souter was capturing the view that had 
prevailed through Roemer.  However, the Court now apparently believes 
that such funding is not barred as long as the principle of funding is 
religion-neutral.  Further, a majority of the Court seems to believe that 
religious worship is equivalent to discussion from a religious 
perspective, as was made clear in a subsequent case involving after-
school clubs for schoolchildren.318 
In Good News Club v. Milford Central School,319 the Court 
examined whether a school district offended constitutional guarantees 
when denying recognition to an after-school club where students would 
engage in religious worship among other activities.320  The District Court 
had found that the club was not merely discussing secular matters from a 
religious point of view but instead was dealing with a subject matter that 
was “decidedly religious in nature.”321 
At issue was whether the limited public forum created by the school 
could exclude the group because of their religious focus.  The Court 
noted that viewpoint discrimination is not permitted even in a limited 
 
 316. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 843-44. 
 317. Id. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 318. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 103 (2001) (describing the 
organization challenging the school policy at issue as “a private Christian organization for children 
ages 6 to 12”). 
 319. Id. at 98. 
 320. See id. at 103.  The Court states: 
The Club sent a set of materials used or distributed at the meetings and the following 
description of its meeting: “The Club opens its session with Ms. Fournier taking 
attendance.  As she calls a child's name, if the child recites a Bible verse the child 
receives a treat.  After attendance, the Club sings songs.  Next Club members engage in 
games that involve, inter alia, learning Bible verses.  Ms. Fournier then relates a Bible 
story and explains how it applies to Club members' lives.  The Club closes with prayer.  
Finally, Ms. Fournier distributes treats and the Bible verses for memorization.” 
Id. 
 321. Id. at 104 (citing Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 21 F. Supp.2d 147, 154 
(N.D.N.Y. 1998)). 
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public forum,322 and that any content restrictions must be reasonable in 
light of the forum’s purpose.323  The Court then reviewed its past cases, 
suggesting that in both Lamb’s Chapel and Rosenberger, the Court had 
struck down policies effecting viewpoint discrimination against religious 
groups.324  The Court concluded that the refusal to recognize the Good 
News Club based on the religious nature of their practices was 
“indistinguishable from the exclusions in these cases,”325 and held that 
the Milford school was engaging in “viewpoint discrimination,”326 
thereby obviating the need to decide whether the exclusion was 
reasonable in light of the limited public forum’s purpose.327 
Yet, Lamb’s Chapel, Rosenberger, and Good News Club appeared 
to be very different cases.  Lamb’s Chapel involved a refusal to air a 
discussion of family issues from a religious perspective.  Rosenberger 
involved an attempt by the University of Virginia to avoid the difficulty 
articulated in Justice Stevens’ Widmar concurrence,328 namely, that 
individuals would be free to criticize but not defend religion.  Because 
the University refused to fund any discussions primarily focused on 
God, students wishing to discuss God’s existence or non-existence 
would similarly be restricted from the forum.  Nonetheless, the Court 
suggested that this was religious viewpoint discrimination without 
making clear how the University’s removing a subject matter from the 
forum constituted viewpoint discrimination. 
Good News Club did not involve an attempt to remove a topic from 
discussion, e.g., arguments about God’s existence.  Rather, this 
restriction was on a particular type of expression, such as prayer.  Thus, 
no viewpoints were excluded by the regulation at issue in Good News 
 
 322. Id. at 106 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 
(1995)). 
 323. Id. at 107 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 
(1985)). 
 324. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001).  The Court states: 
In Lamb's Chapel, we held that a school district violated the Free Speech Clause of the 
First Amendment when it excluded a private group from presenting films at the school 
based solely on the films' discussions of family values from a religious perspective.  
Likewise, in Rosenberger, we held that a university's refusal to fund a student 
publication because the publication addressed issues from a religious perspective 
violated the Free Speech Clause. 
Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. (“We hold that the exclusion constitutes viewpoint discrimination.”). 
 327. Id. (“Because the restriction is viewpoint discriminatory, we need not decide whether it is 
unreasonable in light of the purposes served by the forum.”). 
 328. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
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Club unless it is argued that prayer offers a distinctive viewpoint that 
cannot be expressed in other types of discourse.  But the Court was not 
suggesting that.  Indeed, the Court rejected that “something that is 
‘quintessentially religious’ or ‘decidedly religious in nature’ cannot also 
be characterized properly as the teaching of morals and character 
development from a particular viewpoint,”329 suggesting that for Free 
Speech Clause purposes, there is “no logical difference in kind between 
the invocation of Christianity by the Club and the invocation of 
teamwork, loyalty or patriotism by other associations to provide a 
foundation for their lessons.”330 
At least two points might be made about this alleged equivalence.  
First, claims to the contrary by the Court notwithstanding, it suggests 
that no viewpoints were excluded by the regulation at issue in Good 
News Club.  Whatever had been excluded by the limitation on prayer 
could have been expressed in a discussion of the relevant topic from a 
sectarian perspective.  Second, the Court has offered a non sequitur to 
support its position.  Basically, by suggesting that religion provides as 
valid a foundation as patriotism, the Court is suggesting that there is no 
legitimate reason to discriminate against discussions from a sectarian 
perspective.  But this is exactly what the district court had found was not 
occurring.331  Rather, such perspectives could be presented, as long as 
method did not involve an inherently religious form such as prayer. 
The Good News Club Court also rejected that the fact that 
elementary schoolchildren were involved made this case different from 
Lamb’s Chapel or Rosenberger.332  The Court noted that the instructors 
were not schoolteachers333 and that young schoolchildren were not 
loitering around the classroom after the schoolday had ended and thus, 
presumably, would not hear the Club’s discussions or prayers from the 
hallway,334 perhaps as a way of suggesting that schoolchildren would not 
misperceive the inclusion as an endorsement by the school.  Yet, 
children would come to know of the programs in other ways than 
through loitering, and young children might not be sophisticated enough 
to reject endorsement merely because the schoolteachers were not the 
instructors. 
 
 329. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111. 
 330. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111 (2001). 
 331. See supra note 320 and accompanying text. 
 332. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113-14. 
 333. Id. at 118. 
 334. Id. at 117. 
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The Good News Club Court worried that the state’s refusal to 
permit the club to use the school facilities would be perceived as 
hostility to religion,335 suggesting that “we cannot say the danger that 
children would misperceive the endorsement of religion is any greater 
than the danger that they would perceive a hostility toward the religious 
viewpoint if the Club were excluded from the public forum.”336  It is 
unclear whether the Court intended to contrast the misperception of 
endorsement with the perception of hostility, as if the failure to permit 
the club to use the facilities would rightly be perceived as hostile, 
whereas the inclusion might be misperceived as endorsement.  In any 
event, the Court’s mischaracterization of the policy at issue as viewpoint 
discrimination coupled with its failure to see that this case differed from 
those cases previously decided in ways that had been previously 
described as significant suggest that some members of the Court will not 
permit legal distinctions to stand in the way of prayer’s resuming its 
“rightful” place in the schools. 
The Court understood that McCollum had precluded the use of 
school facilities for religious instruction,337 but distinguished that case 
because in Good News Club there was “simply no integration and 
cooperation between the school district and the Club.”338  Yet, given that 
the integration/cooperation factor was downplayed or ignored so that the 
Court could uphold the program at issue in Zorach,339 and given all of 
the other arguments offered by the Court, e.g., that prayer should not be 
distinguished for constitutional purposes from discussions from a 
religious perspective,340 it would seem that Good News Club might be 
used to justify a whole range of religious practices on-site during school 
time in the name of “neutrality.”341  Indeed, given all of the secular 
instruction that occurs during the day, it would be unsurprising for some 
members of the Court to claim that the failure to include religious 
instruction or prayer should be viewed as manifesting hostility to 
religion. 
 
 335. Id. at 118. 
 336. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 118 (2001). 
 337. Id. at 116 n.6. 
 338. Id. 
 339. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting that Zorach also involved the 
integration and cooperation factor). 
 340. See supra note 328 and accompanying text. 
 341. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 114. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
The Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence as applied to 
religion in the schools has varied greatly over the past sixty years.  The 
articulated understanding of the Clause’s restraints has run the gamut 
from strict separation to required accommodation.  Members of the 
Court have suggested on the one hand that prayer can of course be kept 
out of school342 and on the other that prayer must be treated in the same 
way for constitutional purposes as discussions of secular subjects 
whether from a religious or non-religious perspective. 
The Endorsement Test has sometimes appeared to offer robust 
protections, precluding the state from favoring one religion over another 
or religion over non-religion.  Yet, at other times, that test has seemed 
infinitely malleable, both in that the states could take simple steps to 
avoid imputations of endorsement and in that a state refusal to permit 
prayer might be interpreted as an attitude of hostility towards religion.343  
Thus, while at one point it was absolutely clear that certain religious 
activities could not take place on-site during school hours, the rationales 
recently articulated by the Court suggest that such a position should now 
be viewed as at best controversial. 
Widmar, Good News Club, Rosenberger, etcetera, do not stand for 
the proposition that because secular subjects are taught, prayers must be 
included during the school day—the school curriculum is not a limited 
public forum.  Yet, presumably, states might be tempted to include 
prayer within the school day even if they are not constitutionally 
required to do so, and it is hardly clear that the Court would now say that 
the Establishment Clause forbids states from doing so. 
The United States is becoming more and more religiously 
diverse.344 As a matter of public policy, this is hardly the time to permit 
 
 342. See McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 235 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(suggesting that the members of the Court and, presumably, the state “can at all times prohibit 
teaching of creed and catechism and ceremonial and can forbid forthright proselyting in the 
schools”). 
 343. Cf. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 85 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“To suggest that 
a moment-of-silence statute that includes the word “prayer” unconstitutionally endorses religion, 
while one that simply provides for a moment of silence does not, manifests not neutrality but 
hostility toward religion.”). 
 344. See Kent Greenawalt, Religiously Based Judgments and Discourse in Political Life, 22 
ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 445, 458 (2007) (“The United States is a country of great diversity 
in culture and religion. The percentage of our people that is neither Christian nor Jewish increases 
steadily . . . . ”); Julie M. Arnold, Note, “Divine” Justice and the Lack of Secular Intervention: 
Abrogating the Clergy-Communicant Privilege in Mandatory Reporting Statutes to Combat Child 
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certain inherently religious activities back in the schools while classes 
are in session—doing so would only lead to further alienation and 
fragmentation within the general populace.  Further, as a constitutional 
matter, the kinds of specious reasoning and mischaracterizations of past 
decisions that would have to be offered to achieve that result would lead 
to the gutting of the Establishment Clause.  Regrettably, however, some 
of the Court’s recent decisions and rationales provide the basis for a 
radical reinterpretation of the Establishment Clause, thereby 
strengthening the suspicion that, in the words of Justice Scalia, 
“principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this 
Court.”345 
The religious, the areligious, and the antireligious may disagree 
about the desirability of having prayer during the school day.  However, 
no one should approve of the Court’s mischaracterizations both of past 
decisions and of the local policies at issue in particular cases as a way of 
promoting a greater sectarian presence in the schools.  The Court’s 
current approach to Establishment Clause guarantees will only lead to a 
growing loss of confidence in the efficacy of constitutional protections 
and in the Court’s own integrity, results that all can agree should be 
avoided at great cost. 
 
Sexual Abuse, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 849, 867 (2008) (noting that “religious diversity [is] continually 
increasing”). 
 345. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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